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ABSTRACT
Efforts to strengthen the global patent system for pharmaceuticals continue to be controversial, and
what will likely be a similarly fraught international debate over price controls has begun.  The
outcome of international negotiations and the resulting policy decisions made by each country will
have many ramifications – influencing the size of future investment in medical research, the
availability of the resulting therapies, how the financial burdens are distributed across countries, and
finally the health of consumers.    This paper considers how legal and regulatory policies affect
whether new drugs are marketed in a country, and how quickly.   Less than one-half of the new
pharmaceutical molecules that are marketed worldwide are sold in any given country, and those that
are sold are often available to consumers in one country only six or seven years after those in
another.  Both price regulation and intellectual property rights influence these outcomes. The
analysis covers a large sample of 68 countries at all income levels and includes all drug launches
over the period 1982-2002.  It uses newly compiled information on legal and regulatory policy, and
is the first systematic analysis of the determinants of drug launch in poor countries.
Jean O. Lanjouw
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
and NBER
lanjouw@are.berkeley.edu  Introduction 
The pharmaceutical industry faces a rapidly evolving legal and regulatory environment.  
Governments, drug companies and advocacy groups continue to engage in a decade-long battle 
over the type of patent rights that will be available to industry, particularly in poor countries.  
Particular criticism has focused on the intellectual property standards required of members of the 
World Trade Organization—standards known as Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property, 
or TRIPS, rules.  International drug pricing is also coming under the spotlight.  Americans have 
accused the Europeans and Canadians of using their price control systems to free-ride on U.S. 
consumers, and the United States is starting to push for regulatory changes in bilateral trade 
negotiations.
2  These pressures may well generate future reforms on a broad scale.   
The choices made by each country about its patent system and price regulation will have 
many  ramifications  –  influencing  the  size  of  future  investment  in  medical  research,  the 
availability of the resulting therapies, how the financial burdens are distributed across countries, 
and finally the health of consumers.   We focus here on how policy choices affect whether new 
drugs are marketed in a country, and how quickly.   Because there are fixed costs associated with 
launching new products, it would seem intuitive that both weaker price regulation and stronger 
intellectual property would facilitate entry by virtue of increasing firm profit.
3  However, what 
makes  this  an  interesting  economic  problem  is  that  intellectual  property  can  have  a  second 
                                                 
2 See, for example, the speech by Mark McClellen, then Commissioner of the U.S. FDA, before the First 
International  Colloquium  on  Generic  Medicine.  September  25,  2003,  Cancun,  Mexico.  Available  at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2003/genericdrug0925.html (accessed 12/28/03). Most recently, the U.S. 
insisted that reforms to Australia’s domestic price and reimbursement system be a part of the AUS Free 
Trade  Agreement  (see  www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/freetrade_ctte  for  details  and  discussion.  
Accessed 1/24/05).  Suggesting a future agenda, see “Ten Questions,” Pfizer Annual Review 2004: “We 
believe Americans carry an unfair share of the global cost of biomedical research.  We think that’s a 
serious issue that should be near the top of the global trade agenda.”   2 
important effect.  While patents indeed make local markets more attractive, they also convey 
control over launch decisions to multinational firms with global interests.
4  Multinationals may 
delay or even avoid launching drugs in lower-priced countries because they are concerned about 
the implications for pricing in other markets.  If they hesitate, and patent rights block otherwise 
willing local entrants, then strong patent rights may actually reduce product entry.    
Although the pricing of patented pharmaceuticals has attracted a great deal of attention 
recently, the question of whether new drugs are marketed at all, remarkably, has not.
5  This is 
significant  given  that  less  than  one-half  of  the  new  pharmaceutical  molecules  marketed 
worldwide are sold in any given country – whether rich or poor.  Even those drugs that are 
eventually marketed in one country frequently appear on pharmacy shelves only six or seven 
years after becoming available to consumers elsewhere.
6  Both price regulation and intellectual 
property  rights  influence  these  outcomes.    The  CEO  of  Pfizer,  Hank  McKinnell,  frankly 
acknowledged this point some years ago when he threatened that the company would withhold 
new treatments from France unless the government allowed higher drug prices (Financial Times, 
December 10, 2001). 
When considering the effect of patent rights it is important to distinguish two main types: 
those  that  protect  of  methods  of  manufacture  (“process  patents”)  and  those  that  protect 
                                                                                                                                                             
3    Local  fixed  costs  include  obtaining  marketing  approval  from  the  country  regulatory  authority  and 
educating doctors and patient groups about the drug’s benefits.  These costs can be sizeable, particularly for 
the first entrant.   
4 While in principle smaller local firms could develop new drugs, in fact multinationals hold almost all 
product patents.  Some 86% of the applications for product patents in India in 1995 were submitted by 
inventors with a non-Indian address (CDRI, 1996) and in most developing countries the share is far 
higher.  As firms based in developing countries also begin to invest in the development and patenting of 
new products they will have the same global marketing incentives and constraints faced by the current 
multinationals. 
5 Although when Gilead Sciences recently offered to expand to 95 the number of countries eligible to 
receive its key anti-retroviral drug “at cost”, the offer was called “disingenuous” by the NGO Doctors 
without Borders because the firm has been supplying only 22 of the original 68 eligible countries.   San 
Francisco Chronicle, March 18, 2005.   3 
pharmaceutical products (“product patents”).
7  Process patents are relatively weak.  While one 
firm’s patents on methods for producing a molecule might give it a monopoly for a time, a 
second firm can legally devise (and patent) a new method and come into the market.   Indeed, 
countries  have  purposefully  chosen  a  “process-only”  patent  regime  for  pharmaceutical 
innovations  in  order  to  foster  a  domestic  industry  based  on  inventing  around  originators’ 
manufacturing  processes.
8    Although  relatively  weak,  process  patents  may  nevertheless 
encourage product entry by slowing down the arrival of competitors, allowing firms to cover 
fixed entry costs.  
The ambiguity arises with product patents because these concentrate control in the hands of 
a  single  innovating  firm.    In  the  debate  preceding  the  TRIPS  Agreement  it  was  argued  that 
countries  refusing  to  grant  product  patents  were  failing  to  get  many  newer  drugs  precisely 
because of the threat of follow-on imitative competition.  If innovator firms could be assured of a 
local monopoly, it was suggested, they would find it attractive to launch more products.  In the 
presence of externalities, however, this argument is no longer obvious. 
Several  mechanisms  can  generate  international  pricing  externalities.  Some  developed 
country  price  regulators  explicitly  use  cross-country  comparisons  to  establish  ceiling  prices.  
U.K. drug prices, for example, are used as an international reference by regulators in Austria, 
Canada, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal (Bloom and van Reneen, 
1998; see also Jacobzone 2000).  Physical arbitrage across country borders can also erode prices 
in higher-priced markets.  Arbitrage is legal among E.U. member countries, which pushes prices 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 A “drug” refers to a chemical entity in any of its presentations – e.g. tablets, capsules, liquid. 
7 Some countries also give additional protection to new formulations and new uses of existing products. 
8  India’s rejection of its adopted colonial British patent code in 1972 in favor of a system allowing only 
short (5-7 year) process patents for drugs provides an example.   With only process patents available, the 
multinational subsidiary Glaxo India faced several local competitors from the first day that it marketed its   4 
in  the  direction  of  uniformity  although  it  has  not  resulted  in  a  single  price  across  markets 
(Kanavos, et. al., 2004; Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004).  Arbitrage between most countries is 
illegal.  Nevertheless there are concerns about black market movements, with occasional high-
profile stories involving developing countries and a soaring trade between the U.S. and Canada.
9 
The  behavior  of  political  interest  groups  can  also  push  prices  toward  uniformity.  
Consumers forcefully object to paying prices that are higher than those they see being charged to 
consumers elsewhere,  giving firms and their regulators reason to fear a political backlash if 
obviously different prices are in place.   A growing literature examines how firms may distort 
behavior to avoid the imposition of regulation or soften its effect.   Glazer and McMillan (1990), 
for example, model pricing by a monopolist where the firm may choose to forestall regulation by 
setting a price closer to that desired by the regulator. Erfle and McMillan (1990) find that oil 
firms  limited  their  price  increases  during  the  1979  oil  crisis.    Price  restraint  was  more 
pronounced on more visible fuels like home heating oil and more likely among large and visible 
firms.  Ellison and Wolfram (2004) show that pharmaceutical firms acted collectively to restrain 
price increases during a period of intensive political discussion of health care reform in the U.S.  
Firms identified as particularly vulnerable to regulation were more likely to engage in price 
restraint and lobbying.  Examining the stock prices of credit card firms, Stango (2003) finds that 
announced  rate  cuts  were  less  damaging  to  returns  when  the  announcements  followed  a 
regulatory threat.  Again this result was more pronounced for politically visible firms.
10  
                                                                                                                                                             
blockbuster drug ranitadine (Zantac); while Cipla was manufacturing a version of the Pfizer drug Viagra 
shortly after the drug’s global launch (Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1998). 
9  For  example,  “HIV  Drugs  For  Africa  Diverted  to  Europe,”  The  Washington  Post,  October,  2002; 
“Europeans Investigate Resale of AIDS Drugs,” New York Times, October 29, 2002.   
10 Behavior beyond pricing may also be affected.   For example Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000) 
examine firm efforts to deter consumer mobilization, and thereby government-imposed regulation, by 
voluntarily limiting their pollution output.   5 
Identifying the precise mechanisms generating pricing externalities across markets is not 
the goal of this paper.  Rather, the concern here is whether product patents can reduce access to 
new drugs by making firms that care about externalities – whatever the source – more important 
players.   Whether access is, in fact, limited is also a key question for interpreting the welfare 
implication of firms’ inability to fully price discriminate across countries.
11 
Two examples of firm behavior in this environment are instructive.  In the late 1980s, 
Bayer chose not to introduce its new antibiotic ciprofloxacin in India.  To do so it would have 
needed to price the product very low to be competitive in that market, at a time when the firm 
was negotiating prices in its more important markets.  Instead, ciprofloxacin was introduced in 
India three years after its world launch by the Indian firm Ranbaxy.  However, eight years after 
the drug’s global launch and long after the entrance of a multitude of local producers, Bayer 
finally entered the Indian market (interview with Bayer executive, India, 1997).  More recently, 
GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer have cut back supplies of their products to Canada to prevent drugs 
from leaving for the United States – where they damage the higher prices that the firms enjoy in 
that country.
12   In both of these situations the multinationals found it profitable to engage in a 
local  market  at  a  low  price.    Their  reluctance  to  do  so  clearly  stemmed  from  the  potential 
implications  for  their  profits  in  other  markets.    What  is  particularly  notable  in  the  story  of 
                                                 
11 Maleug and Schwartz (1994) show that uniform pricing by a monopolist yields lower global welfare 
than  third-degree  price  discrimination  when  demand  dispersion  is  such  that  many  markets  are  left 
unserved under uniform pricing.  See also Scherer and Watal (2002).  This result is accentuated if one 
allows for global equity concerns and differences in the marginal utility of income across consumers (See 
Jack  and  Lanjouw,  2005,  where  they  apply  many-person  Ramsey  pricing  to  the  problem  of  global 
pharmaceutical pricing.) 
12 Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2003; “Pfizer Cuts Supplies to Canadian Drugstores,” The Washington 
Post, April 5, 2005.   6 
ciprofloxacin is the further suggestion that pricing externalities may become less acute later in 
the product lifecycle.
13     
Given the considerations raised here, one would expect to see three types of entry into 
poorer country markets.  Firms interested in producing only for the local or regional market 
should be willing to enter at any time, assuming that expected returns in the local market at least 
cover the fixed costs of entry.   Multinationals might enter poorer markets quickly in situations 
where they can set a price that is close to their target price in the major markets. Sales would 
then be limited to the local elite.  Finally, one might see multinationals waiting for some time 
after the global launch of a new product, and then entering developing country markets with a 
low price that allowed them to capture market share. Which of these strategies are feasible and 
likely will be influenced by price regulation and the intellectual property regime. 
To date there has been little analysis of the determinants of international drug launches.  
Danzon, Wang and Wang (2005) examine launch data from 25 major markets for the years 1994-
1998, and a selected sample of 85 new chemical entities (NCE).  They are specifically concerned 
with the effects of price regulation. Rather than trying to summarize differences in price control 
systems directly, they use the price for a standard unit in a drug’s therapy class in an earlier year 
as indicator of the intensity of regulation. A similar variable is constructed for expected market 
size.  Both higher prices and larger markets are found to have a significantly positive effect on 
the likelihood and speed of launch. 
Kyle  (2004a  and  2004b)  analyzes  21  OECD  countries  and  much  larger  set  of  drug 
launches,  including  1577  molecules  developed  during  the  period  1980-2002.  She  focuses 
primarily on how firm characteristics affect launch timing and finds, for example, that domestic 
                                                 
13 One candidate explanation is the fact that controlled prices set in high-income countries in the early 
entry years are typically not renegotiated over time (Jacobzone, 2000).   7 
firms  have  a  5  times  higher  probability  of  launching  at  home  (with  domestic  status  most 
important in Japan and Italy).  A dummy for price regulation has a significantly negative effect 
and she finds that firms are less likely to follow launch in a low-price country with launch in a 
high-price country. 
   None of these papers consider intellectual property (IP) as a determinant of marketing 
decisions.    McCalman  (2004)  provides  an  econometric  analysis  of  how  intellectual  property 
might influence launch decisions – of American Hollywood movies.  His data are from 1997-99 
covering 37 countries, and he estimates hazard models for the effect of IP strength on the speed 
of film launches across countries.   He  finds a  non-monotonic relationship with moderate  IP 
associated with the most rapid diffusion.   There is, in his context however, no scope for pricing 
spillovers across countries. 
  This paper analyzes launch patterns across a very large sample of 68 countries over the 
period 1982-2002.  The paper provides descriptive statistics; and probit and hazard analyses of 
the  likelihood  and  speed  of  launch.    Explanatory  variables  include  those  related  to  the 
attractiveness  of  markets  and  local  technical  capacity.  Those  of  primary  interest  are  newly 
constructed  policy  variables  for  the  availability  and  strength  of  patent  protection  and  the 
stringency of price control.  This is the first analysis of pharmaceutical launch patterns that 
includes developing countries.  Their experience is of independent interest and provides more 
variation in the policy variables than is found among OECD members. 
 
I.  The Timing of Drug Approvals and Patent Protection 
To understand how market entry relates to price regulation and the patent system it helps 
to have in mind a clear idea of timing.   Figure 1 illustrates with a stylized example.  We assume   8 
that there are two countries, the United States and a lower-income country called “Other”.   An 
innovator firm discovers a promising new molecule and patents it in the United States.  The top 
half of the first timeline corresponds to this patent, with time zero being the date at which the 
U.S. patent application was made.  Following application it typically takes about 1.5 years before 
a patent is granted (King, 2003).  Until recent harmonization to the 20 year standard agreed 
under TRIPS, the United States had a statutory patent term of 17 years from the grant of the 
patent.  This would give a total expected patent term of 18.5 years.   In addition, however, the 
U.S. has a provision to allow for an extension of the patent term on pharmaceutical products to 
compensate for time spent in the testing and regulatory review process.
14  The average extension 
during the period of our data was about 2 years (Grabowski and Vernon, 2000), pushing the 
expected expiration date out to 20.5 years after application as indicated. 
  After having applied for a patent on its new molecule in the United States, the innovator 
firm has up to 12 months to submit its corresponding patent applications in other countries.
15  
The bottom half of the patent timeline tracks the firm’s product patent in “Other”, assuming that 
product patents are available there. Again time zero is the date when that the application is 
submitted and it falls one year later than for the U.S patent. 
  Applications to protect manufacturing processes may be, and often are, submitted some 
time after initial product patent applications.  Thus there may be additional patents associated 
with the new product.  These patents would have timelines shifted to the right of the one shown, 
                                                 
14 Introducing the option for a patent extension was one part of a larger political agreement that 
also  allowed  generic  firms  to  enter  the  U.S.  market  by  showing  equivalence  to  an  existing 
approved  product  and  without  repeating  full  clinical  trials  (the  Drug  Price  Competition  and 
Patent Term Restoration Act or “Hatch-Waxman Act” of 1984). 
15 This period may be extended via a PCT application, but most subsequent applications are 
made a year later almost to the day (based on data from the Thomson Derwent World Patent 
Index).   9 
with expiration dates further out in time.  An innovative firm can effectively extend the number 
of years that it controls the marketing of a product if it can successfully patent all commercially 
feasible methods to manufacture it.
16   
  Typically a pharmaceutical product patent application is made early in the R&D process.  
Thus, in the years following its U.S. patent application the innovator firm develops the potential 
product.  If this stage is successful, the firm develops a dossier that describes the drug’s quality 
and characteristics and contains reports on tests of safety and efficacy.  The completed dossier is 
submitted  to  the  U.S.  Food  and  Drug  Administration  (U.S.  FDA)  for  marketing  approval.  
During  the  mid-1900’s,  the  regulatory  approval  process  took,  on  average,  about  1.5  years 
(various sources in the policy references).  Although there was considerable variation, during our 
period of analysis the average total time elapsed to final approval in the United States was about 
9 years after the initial patent application (based on the 18.5 year pre-extension term and Figures 
3 and 4 in Grabowski and Vernon, 2000).  Following approval, drugs enter the market directly, 
as indicated on the figure.
17 
  The date of entry into the U.S. market represents the first global launch of the product in 
this illustration.  The first global launch in any market is time zero in the econometric analysis 
and starts the lower “launch lag” timeline in the figure. 
                                                 
16 This may difficult.  For example, in 1991 Eli Lilly was losing molecule protection in the U.S. on 
its major drug cefaclor, but anticipated extending the protection of its drug on the basis of a large 
number of U.S. process patents. At the same time, however, the Indian firm Ranbaxy found an 
unpatented  manufacturing  process  that  undermined  this  strategy.  In  the  words  of  a  Ranbaxy 
executive, “56 processes were under patent (by Lilly in the U.S.) and we found the 57
th” (personal 
interview, 1997). 
17 Competitiveness and Performance Indicators 2001.  Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness 
Taskforce.    Available  at  http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/pictf/cpi2001.pdf  (accessed 
1/3/05).   10 
When the product enters the market in “Other” depends upon the  firm attempting to 
market it.  Most developing countries will give regulatory approval to a drug largely on the basis 
of a product’s acceptance by the U.S. FDA or similar E.U. authority.  Thus our originator firm 
could submit its dossier when it makes its submission to the U.S. FDA and expect approval at 
more or less the same time.   A  generic  applicant, on the other hand,  would need to show 
equivalence to the already approved product, and this might delay its submission.  On average 
the approvals process in developing countries during the mid-1990s was also on the order of 1.5 
years (policy references).  Thus, assuming a firm makes the effort to enter quickly, we indicate 
approval in “Other” as one to 1.5 years after the U.S. approval date. 
In most countries, marketing approval is followed by a period during which the firm 
negotiates  the  conditions  of  entry  with  a  government  body  charged  with  regulating 
reimbursement and pricing.  This process can naturally vary in length depending on the stances 
taken by the negotiating parties and the procedural framework.  A study of developed country 
markets found that the average additional delay due to price negotiations was relatively short – a 
few up to about ten months.
18   Assuming that negotiations might be somewhat more protracted 
in developing countries, we indicate market entry in “Other” at year 10. This implies entry two 
years after the first global launch, as shown on the bottom timeline.  
What these timelines highlight is that the effective life of a patent – the number of years 
during  which  a  patent  protects  a  product  that  is  out  in  the  market  generating  revenue  –  is 
typically nine or ten years shorter than the statutory term of the patent.  We refer to this figure 
when interpreting the results below. 
                                                 
18  ibid.  Consultant and industry sources cited in Danzon et al (2003) suggest somewhat longer 
delays due to price negotiation.   11 
II.  The Drug Launch Data 
The  launch  data  are  drawn  primarily  from  the  December  2002  “LifeCycle:  Drug 
Launches” database constructed by the private vendor IMS Health.  The database identifies the 
month and year that a product first has retail sales in a given country, and indicates which entries 
represent first world launches of new chemical entities (NCE).
19 For each product launched, it 
gives the tradename, the Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) code, active ingredient, 
composition, and firm making the launch.  Coverage includes entry during the 21 years 1982-
2002 in the retail sector and, for some countries, the hospital sector also.  The Indian market was 
not covered by IMS during this period so we incorporate similar information obtained from the 
Indian market research company, ORG-MARG.  The Indian data cover a partial, but broad, set 
of  therapeutic  classes  –  including  launches  of  all  antibiotics,  ulcer  and  cancer  drugs  –  and 
includes all products in those classes launched in the Indian market during the period 1986-98. 
The combined dataset covers 68 countries or country groups, 60% of which have at least twenty 
years of information.
20  
Because the brand names given to the same product change across countries, and may 
include  generics,  common  products  must  be  linked  across  countries  on  the  basis  of  active 
                                                 
19  In  some  cases  the  same  chemical  was  indicated  as  being  ‘new’  more  than  once,  or  was 
identified as ‘new’ at a country launch later than the first launch in the world.  In these cases the 
first appearance is taken as the global launch date.   
20 French West Africa (Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Senegal) and 
Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatamala, Honduras, Panama) are aggregated by 
IMS because they are very small markets.  During the period 1982-1992 we have data for “West 
Germany”, which overlaps with data for “Germany” beginning in 1989.  Inspection of the entries 
for these two “different” countries during the overlap period reveals some drugs released in both 
countries and others in one or the other.  These observations are treated as a single market during 
the  overlap  period.    For  the  1982-1988  period,  IMS  also  reports  launch  information  for 
“Malaysia”, “Singapore”, and a “Malaysia, Singapore” hybrid.  Drugs released as “Malaysia, 
Singapore”  are  treated  as  having  been  launched  in  each  country  and  the  observations  are 
replicated.   12 
ingredients.  Although (active) “ingredient” is a variable field, it is incomplete in the IMS data, 
with a sizable share of the observations missing active ingredient information altogether.
21  We 
assume that drugs having a tradename that is the same as one of the NCE chemicals are generics 
and assign to them their tradename chemical as an ingredient. After having made this change, 
about 10% of the observations were left with missing ingredient information.  The share of 
launches  missing  this  key  linking  variable  differs  considerably  across  countries  but  is  not 
obviously  related  to  language  or  income.    For  example,  18%  of  U.S.  launches  are  missing 
ingredient but only 9% of Japanese and Swedish launches. 
The  IMS  data  contains  a  field  “Composition”  which  includes  both  active  and  inert 
ingredients.  Two-thirds of the observations with missing information in the ingredient field had 
information  in  the  composition  field.  This  field  revealed  that  many  of  products  missing 
information are not likely to be NCEs (for example, “charcoal”, “calf blood extract”, “acne acid 
detergent”).  While the ingredient field typically had chemicals listed in the common chemical 
nomenclature,  those  listed  in  the  composition  field  were  more  often  in  the  language  of  the 
country of release (for example, “pirodoxina chlorhidrato”, “rosskastanien samen-trokenextrakt”, 
“prodotto a base di aglio”).  To avoid introducing new noise and probably a bias associated with 
language, no attempt was made to use the composition field to identify active ingredients where 
they were missing.  Observations that do not have identified ingredients are dropped from the 
analysis except in Table 4 below. 
To  improve  the  links  between  common  products  for  those  observations  that  do  have 
identified  ingredients,  we  constructed  a  set  of  chemical  “equivalent  names”  for  each  of  the 
                                                 
21 There was considerable improvement in reporting over time: about 1/3 of the 1980’s launch 
observations are missing ingredient, while the data are complete for launches in the last five 
years.   13 
NCEs.  Most of the equivalent names came from a search of an online chemical database called 
ChemID Plus.
22  This yielded 5,374 synonyms.  In addition, we found the original tradename 
under which each NCE was first launched, identified all products launched under each of those 
tradenames, and the products’ ingredients.  Whenever  a given NCE tradename had different 
ingredients  listed  for  products  in  different  countries,  these  were  scrutinized  to  find  different 
spellings due to language or misspellings.  This resulted in a further 61 equivalent names to use 
for matching. 
  Drugs  assigned  to  an  ATC  code  beginning  with  “T”  (diagnostic  agents  and  testing 
devices) or “V” (various, including dietetic supplements and similar products) were dropped. 
Appendix  Table  A1  gives  an  example  of  a  launch  pattern  for  the  pharmaceutical 
ciprofloxacin.  Countries are ordered by date of market entry.  Ciprofloxacin was first marketed 
in the Philippines in October of 1986, so this date is time zero.  The number of months between 
the date of the first global launch of a drug and its launch in a given country is the launch lag.  
These are given in the last column of the table.  
 
III.  Description of Global Launch Patterns 
Table 1 gives the number of NCE’s with a first appearance (global launch date) in each 
year.  The first column indicates the number of new “blockbusters”.  These are drugs that were 
found among the top 200 in terms of world revenue in 1998 or 2003, or among the top 100 U.S. 
revenue earners in 1995 and 1993 (Med Ad News, various issues).  The second column includes 
all drugs.  There was an increase in the number of new chemical entities launched in the mid-
1980’s,  with  some  fall  off  in  the  numbers  in  the  early  2000’s  (perhaps  due  in  part  to  data 
                                                 
22 at http://chem.sis.nlm.nih.gov/chemidplus/cmplxqry.html  (accessed March, 2003).   14 
processing delays).  On the whole, however, the number of NCE’s appearing each year was 
fairly similar over the period. 
There  were  836  new  pharmaceuticals  first  marketed  during  the  period  1982  –  2002.  
Table 2 indicates the location of these first launches.  The table includes countries having at least 
one first launch, ordered by income class.
23  To give an accurate picture of the actual importance 
of  countries  as  a  location  of  first  launch,  these  figures  must  be  adjusted  to  account  for  the 
incomplete coverage of some countries over the period (see column 2).  For example, Russia 
appears as the location of first launch only twice, but this is due in part to our having only eight 
years of information.  Adjusted shares are in column 3.  They are constructed as follows. Let djt 
be the observed number of first launches in country j in year t and Dt the observed first launches 
in year t worldwide.  Let sj0 be an estimate of country j’s share of first launches based on data 
from the seven-year period 1995-2001 when information was available for all countries.  For the 
remaining years, first estimate the true number of first launches as
￿ Î
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the set of all countries having data in year t.  Then, for each country jÎ Jt construct estimates of 






s = = = = .  Each country’s adjusted share of first launches over the 
entire  period  is  a  weighted  average  of  sj0  (the  share  over  1995-2001)  and  the  other  annual 
estimates sjt available for that country.   
Two points stand out in this table.  First, firms almost invariably launch products first in 
rich country markets.  Second, a very large share of all drugs is launched first in Japan (and only 
there – see below).   15 
Figure 2 gives an idea of the number of countries that an NCE typically reaches.  It is 
based only on the 300 NCEs with global launch dates early in the period (1982-1988) to avoid 
truncation.  We see that just a very few drugs from that time period were launched worldwide. 
The mean number of countries is 20, the median is 9, and almost 20% of new drugs are marketed 
in just a single country.    Of the 54 single-market drugs represented in this figure, 23 were sold 
only in Japan, 13 only in Italy, with the rest scattered across countries. Japan is clearly distinctive 
– it is the location of 24% of all drug launches, but 43% of those marketed in a single country.   
From 1995 there was a marked increase in the number of countries reached within a short span 
after  global  launch,  so  it  is  likely  that  today  the  distribution  shown  in  Figure  2  has  shifted 
rightward. 
Table  3  indicates  how  long  it  takes  for  a  drug  to  become  available  to  a  country’s 
consumers.  Calculations in this table are restricted to the 122 NCEs first launched 1986-92 and 
assigned to therapy classes for which the Indian data are available.  There is some truncation for 
drugs entering after a long delay because the data end at 2002, but each NCE has at least 120 
months of information.  It is evident that lags tend to lengthen as one goes down the income 
rankings.    The  group  summary  at  the  bottom  of  the  table  shows  that  differences  are  most 
pronounced between the high-income countries and the rest.
24  However, there is also clearly a 
great deal of variation across individual countries: median launch lags range from months (Japan, 
Switzerland) to over eight years (Latvia, Lebanon).  There is also considerable variation across 
products within countries: For example, the difference between the 10
th and 90
th percentile of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
23  The  income  classes  follow  those  in  the  World  Bank  2002  World  Development  Indicators 
Report.   The ranges for GNI per capita measured in 1999 U.S. dollars are: Low £ $755 < Lower 
£ $2995 < Middle £ $9265 < High.    16 
lag distribution is over 10 years in Morocco and Peru and over 7 years in some of the OECD 
countries. 
To  avoid  differing  degrees  of  truncation  across  years,  Table  4  restricts  attention  to 
launches that occur within 10 years of the first global launch of each NCE.  The ten-year span 
includes  most  market  entry,  as  shown  in  the  previous  table.    Table  4  includes  the  91 
“blockbuster” and 462 total drugs in all therapy classes first launched during 1982-92 (so India is 
dropped).  The first column, on the left side of the table gives the percentage of all drugs that was 
eventually launched in the row country at any point within a ten year lag.  The second column 
gives the same statistic but grossed up as though products missing ingredient information are, in 
fact, NCE products.  As discussed in the previous section, this is clearly not the case so these 
values would be generous upper bounds.  The third column gives the percentage of blockbusters 
eventually launched in each country. 
Considering the first column, the percentage of drugs launched within a ten  year lag 
ranges from lows of 19% and 22% (Egypt, Malaysia) to highs of 49% and 53% (Italy, Japan).  
Thus,  no  consumers  anywhere  have  access  to  more  than  about  one-half  of  the  new 
pharmaceuticals that enter the world market.  The mean (unweighted) percentage is 34.8% for 
the high-income countries, and 29.9% and 28.4% for the middle- and low-income countries, 
respectively.  As  expected,  “blockbuster”  drugs  that  experience  high  sales  revenues  in  the 
developed world are also launched more frequently in the poorer countries than drugs overall, 
although in no country is the rate for even this more select group close to 100%.  The fact that 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 The difference for high income countries is not driven by the fact that Japan has a large 
number of unique drugs. Dropping Japan lowers the average number of drugs to 40 and increases 
the median lag to 28 months.   17 
drugs are not launched more widely can be due to the availability of substitutes, differences in 
disease patterns across countries, and rejection by some local regulatory authorities.   
The remaining columns of Table 4 give the cumulative distribution of drug launches at 
different lags from one year to nine years. Thus the column headed “3” indicates the percentage 
of all NCE launched within ten years in a given row country that arrived in that market within 
three years.  Countries are listed by income group and, looking down this column, we again see 
that drugs are more likely to be launched within three years in the richer countries than in the 
poorer countries.  This is highlighted in Figure 3, which shows unweighted averages for each 
income group.  However, the pattern is not strong.  Israel, at 27%, for example, has a smaller 
share  on  the  market  this  quickly  than  either  the  Philippines  or  Thailand  (44%  and  41% 
respectively).  Again we see the large range of experience overall.  Germany has 75% of its 
drugs on the market within three years of the global launch, Saudi Arabia just 16%. 
  Most global market entry is done by the “first” firm, defined as the firm that makes the 
first  global  launch  of  an  NCE  in  a  high-income  country,  or  any  country  for  the  few  NCE 
launched exclusively in the poorer countries.  This firm almost surely holds most of the patents 
associated with an NCE and is typically a multinational.  A smaller share is done by “other” 
firms – which may in many cases be entry done under license as part of a marketing arrangement 
and  thus  effectively  controlled  by  the  first  firm  (the  data  do  not  allow  one  to  distinguish).  
“Other” firms may also be multinationals.   
Shares for the low- and middle-income countries are shown in Table 5, broken down by 
type of patent regime.   Moving from left to right, a stronger patent regime is associated with 
more of the drug launch in a country being done by the first firm.  Overall, two-thirds of all drug 
launches and three-quarters of blockbuster launches are done by the first firm.  These firms are   18 
responsible for about 80% of all new drug launches in the poorer countries that occur within the 
first 3 years.   That these firms tend to enter markets more rapidly is also clear in Figure 4, which 
shows the timing of drug entry in high or lower-income countries conditional on launch being 
done by the “first” or “other” firm.  
 
To summarize the descriptive statistics: 
·  Only 20% to 50% of all drugs launched globally are on the market in any country after 10 
years.  This rises to 60% to 85% for high revenue blockbuster drugs. 
·  Across  countries  there  is  considerable  variation  in  how  quickly  drugs  arrive  on  the 
market given that they are ever launched.   
·  There is some indication that countries with higher GDP per capita tend to obtain new 
drugs more quickly, but the pattern is not strong.  
·  Within any given country there is also considerable variation in how quickly individual 
drugs are launched – ranging from a few months to over a decade.  
·  On average, the  firm associated with the first  marketing of  a new chemical entity is 
responsible for most of the subsequent launches of that product and tends to enter drugs 
more quickly than other firms launching the same product. 
 
IV.  The Explanatory Variables 
Annual series were constructed to describe each of the main policy areas: 
Intellectual Property Protection: These include indicator variables for the availability of 
patents on innovative methods of manufacture for pharmaceuticals (process patents), and on new 
pharmaceutical  compounds  (product  patents).    Historically,  countries  have  offered  either  no   19 
protection in the area of pharmaceuticals, process patents only, or both process  and product 
patents. The data include the statuary term of each form of protection, and information about 
whether a country allows for an extension to the patent term to compensate for time spent in the 
marketing approvals process. 
How a country interprets and enforces its patent laws clearly affects how meaningful any 
patent “rights” are to their owners.  Unfortunately this is a difficult characteristic to capture in 
data.  We use one variable, “strong,” falling between 0 and 1, which takes on a higher value as a 
country limits how patent rights can be curtailed.  Specifically, it is the average of non-missing 
values for three other 0/1 indicators: the first equals one if a country will not impose compulsory 
licensing until three years after patent grant; the second equals one if the country has no formal 
obligation to “work” a patent (supply the market); and the third equals one if the country does 
not revoke patents for failing to work if there is such a requirement.  This variable was devised 
by Walter Park, who provided the data required for its construction for most countries for each 
five years beginning in 1980 (see Ginarte and Park, 1997, for details).  For missing countries, his 
data were supplemented assuming current values throughout the period based on the legal texts 
referenced below.   A similar variable composed of enforcement-related indicators was not found 
to have any explanatory power and therefore was not included in the estimations. 
Price  Control:  There  is  bewildering  variety  in  the  ways  in  which  different countries 
approach the control of pharmaceutical prices.  We consider systems of explicit price regulation 
and summarize the variation across countries with two dummy variables – one for the existence 
of “some” price control regulation and the second for “extensive” price control.   A price regime 
is label “extensive” if all drugs are regulated, rather than just a subset of the market, or if a   20 
country’s price regulation is identified by commentators as being particularly rigorous. The set of 
reports consulted in making this determination is given in the policy section of the references. 
The legal and regulatory policies of a country result from some process, and this makes 
endogeneity an obvious concern when trying to understand the effects of any policy regime.  In 
our case, one might expect firms to lobby hardest to obtain strong patent protection in countries 
viewed  as  attractive  markets  for  entry,  potentially  creating  a  positive  bias  in  estimated 
relationships.
25  However,  a  consideration  of  history  suggests  that  substantive  within-country 
changes in the patent law can reasonably be treated as exogenous for our purpose – certainly in 
their timing.  Such changes tend to be forced by the rules of entry into new political groups (e.g., 
Portugal  and  Spain  joining  the  EU  in  1992);  by  newly  negotiated  standards  created  at  an 
international  level  (e.g.,  many  poor  countries  and  TRIPS,  Mexico  and  NAFTA);  or  a 
vulnerability to trade pressure and the political dynamic of bilateral negotiations (Korea, Brazil, 
and  Jordan  in  the  1980s  and  1990s).  (See  Sell,  2003.)  The  link  to  the  dynamic  of  trade 
negotiations  is  reflected  in  comments  by  the  body  that  advises  the  U.S.  Congress  and 
administration on IPR and trade, the Industry Functional Advisory Committee on IPR for Trade 
Matters (IFAC-3), in its reports to the US Trade Representative: 
 
CAFTA (the Central American Free Trade Agreement) “mirrors, as closely as possible, 
the Singapore and Chile FTAs in order to establish clear precedents in most key areas of 
intellectual property protection for future FTA negotiations.”  
And  
                                                 
25 And lobby they do. For a candid discussion see historical issues of the PhRMA annual report.    21 
“IFAC-3  is  particularly  gratified  that….with  high-level  agreements  with  both  small 
developing  countries  in the  CAFTA  and  a  strong  and  mature  developed  country  like 
Australia,  it  will  prove  much  easier  to  convince  future  FTA  countries  that  strong 
intellectual  property  protection  is  in  the  interests  of  all  countries  regardless  of  their 
economic circumstances.”  (Italics mine).
26 
 
Price regulation is more likely to be endogenous. While patent laws change only rarely, 
and then in fairly specific and major ways, governments may more flexibly adjust price controls.  
In particular, a government might be willing to limit the scope or intensity of an existing system 
even where it would not dismantle it altogether.  Weaker regulation might be associated with 
pressure from an industry with an eye on entry for other reasons.    There are, however, strong 
countervailing forces that limit industry influence, such as budgetary pressures and vigorous 
lobbying by patient groups and the retired elderly. 
Control Variables:  To mitigate potential endogeneity concerns and remove noise, we 
construct controls for other characteristics that one might expect to influence pharmaceutical 
marketing.  Some of these control variables are of independent interest.    Given our hypothesis 
that  multinationals  might  be  reluctant  to  launch  in  poor  countries  when  they  face  price 
competition, and that local firms could be an alternative source of new drug entry, the presence 
of a competitive local industry should be relevant.  The finding in Section 3 that innovator firms 
are responsible for most global marketing suggests that the price effect of local competition 
                                                 
26 Industry Functional Advisory Committee on IPR for Trade Matters (IFAC-3) in reports to the 
USTR:  http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA-
DR/CAFTA_Reports/asset_upload_file571_5945.pdf    and 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_fil
e164_3139.pdf   22 
could be particularly important.  Country R&D expenditure (in all areas) as a share of GDP is 
included as a regressor to capture local technical capacity and thus the potential for imitative 
competition.   High tariffs in a country may also make entry less attractive to multinationals that 
would  anticipate  importing  supplies  from  centralized  production  facilities.    High-income 
countries have zero rates on pharmaceuticals, but in the poorer countries there is considerable 
variation, with rates as high as 35%.
27  
Differences  in  market  opportunities  are  captured  by  the  demographic  indicators 
population size and the percentages of the population aged 0-14, 15-64, 65+ years. Economic 
variables include the level of GDP per capita.  The Gini coefficient of inequality, and asset 
ownership, provide some measure of differences in income distributions.  We also control for the 
share of health expenditure in GDP, and the share of health expenditure that is private, and the 
share of doctors in the population.  
Characteristics  of  the  regulatory  process  can  also  influence  market  entry.  Health 
authorities differ in their standards and some may reject a new drug even when it is on the 
market elsewhere.  Delays in the marketing approvals process can take the speed of drug launch 
at least partially out of the hands of firms.
28  The observed timing of market entry reflects some 
combination of the decisions of firms and the complexity and efficiency of a country’s regulatory 
process.  Thus, the estimations include other elements of government policy that might directly 
                                                                                                                                                             
(both accessed 12/06/04). 
27  The data used here were drawn from the UNCTAD database and kindly supplied by Adrian 
Otten.  See European Union (2003) in the policy references for a description of these regulations. 
28 Firms are able to influence how quickly a given drug moves through the approvals process.  
They can work with more institutions and offer greater compensation to participants in order to 
rapidly  reach  required  sample  sizes  for  clinical  trials.  They  can  direct  more  resources  to 
interacting  with  the  authorities  during  the  approvals  process.    Dranove  and  Meltzer  (1994) 
provide evidence from the United States that firm work harder to speed the approval of drugs 
that are later successful in the market.    23 
affect or proxy for other conditions that influence entry timing, beyond our key variables of 
interest.  These include whether a country has adopted an essential drug list, standard treatment 
guidelines or a national formulary.  For E.U. members we include an indicator for the 1995 
establishment of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency.  This agency offers a centralized, 
and thus potentially more rapid, approvals procedure within the European Union.  
Many of the explanatory variables are available annually and others are in one or several 
cross-sections.  All variables used in the estimations presented below are defined in Appendix 
Table A2 with summary statistics in Table A3. 
  
V.  Econometric Analyses of Launch Determinants 
This  section  describes  the  probit  and  hazard  model  estimations  used  to  analyze  the 
probability and speed of drug launch.   Results are discussed in the following section. 
 All estimations are done separately for the high-income countries and for a combined 
low-and middle-income grouping.  We consider four different subsets of the NCE in the data.  
The base estimations include all drugs.  However, some drugs launched in one location fail to 
reach other county markets because they do not meet those countries’ local health standards for 
safety or efficacy. We want to distinguish between firm’s decisions not to launch, and a failure to 
fulfill marketing requirements.  Thus, for the high-income countries we also estimate the models 
on a “high quality” subset of NCEs, defined as those that obtain marketing approval and are 
launched in either the U.S. or the U.K within 2 years.  This follows Danzon, et. al. (2005), who   24 
argue that these two countries have the most stringent regulation and that therefore approval for 
their markets implies a minimum quality standard.
29 
For the low- and middle-income group we focus on the set of “blockbuster” drugs – those 
of greatest commercial importance as measured by sales revenue.  The group includes drugs of 
great medical importance and also some major “lifestyle” drugs.  We examine the launch of 
blockbuster drugs in the low and middle-income group only, because one could expect drugs in 
this group to be launched extensively in the rich countries (although see the third column of 
Table 4.)  
Finally, when examining launch in the lower-income group we consider separately NCE 
in therapy classes that have sales relatively more concentrated in developing countries:  class A 
(alimentary tract and metabolism) and class J (systemic anti-infectives).   The sales of drugs in 
class A and J were 23.6% and 23.0% of all sales in India in 2000, while only 10.4% and 18.1% 
of the NCE in our data fell in these therapy classes (sales figures from Chaudhuri, et. al., 2004).  
Firms might have stronger incentive to enter poorer markets with products in these classes.
30 
Tables  6-8  and  Tables  10-11  contain  the  estimation  results  for  probit  models  of  the 
probability that a new drug is launched in a given country within either two years or ten years of 
the drug’s first appearance in the global market.  Observations are at the level of a country/NCE 
and the dependent variable takes on the value one if the NCE was marketed within the indicated 
                                                 
29 Unlike Danzon, et. al., we drop the U.S. and the U.K. as launch countries when analyzing this 
subset  since  their  launch  probabilities  are  biased  upwards  by  construction.    Another  way  to 
approach the quality issue is to restrict attention to drugs known to satisfy a given country’s 
standards  because  they  are  observed  entering  its  market  within  ten  years,  and  analyze  the 
probability that those drugs are launched within two years (analogous to Table 4).  Unreported 
estimates on this subset support the results discussed below.  
30 Virtually all drugs are also marketed in the high-income countries.  Of the over four hundred 
NCE launched through 1992, only eight were launched exclusively in the low- and middle-
income countries and only one of these in more than a single country.   25 
period of time.  A 24-month lag is below the median lag for high-income countries, and below 
the 10
th percentile for low- and middle-income countries (see Table 3).  Thus, product entry 
within this timeframe represents relatively rapid launch, particularly in the poorer countries.  As 
discussed in Section I, the procedural steps associated with market entry should not typically 
require a delay longer than two years, particularly for the originator firm (see Figure 1).  Thus, if 
a launch fails to happen within two years one can fairly assume that this failure involved at least 
some element of firm choice to delay, or that a decision was made to enter but the product was 
rejected by the health authority.  The descriptive statistics presented above suggest that a lag of 
ten years is a reasonable indicator of whether a drug is “ever launched”. 
Table 9 contains estimation results for a log-logistic hazard model of the time path of 
country launches.
31   The log-logistic model implies that the probability of failing to have a new 
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This  functional  form  allows  for  increasing  and  then  decreasing  hazards  rates  through  the 
parameter ￿ and was preferred over other frequently used specifications such as Cox proportional 
hazard or Weibull models for all subsets of the data.  Comparing the empirical cumulative hazard 
rates and the Cox-Snell residuals revealed predicted hazards that were too high in the later years.  
This is reasonably explained by the fact that for each country the sample is a combination of 
drugs that are eventually launched – hence which are well described by the model – and those 
that never will be.  To accommodate this unobserved heterogeneity across drugs, the estimations 
also allow for a multiplicative factor on individual hazards having a Gamma distribution with 
                                                 
31 Global launches are defined as being a launch in the first month to avoid those observations 
being dropped.   26 
mean one and variance ￿.  This standard form yields a convenient analytical expression for the 
likelihood function.  
In all specifications, countries enter the estimation for a given NCE only if the NCE’s 
global launch precedes  the entry of the country into the database.  To  avoid truncation, the 
hazard estimations include NCE first launched 1982-2001, the probit estimations for a two-year 
lag include those first launched 1982-2000, while those for the ten-year lag include only NCE 
with first launch 1982-1992.  All estimations include full sets of dummy variables for both the 
date of NCE first global launch and the fourteen ATC therapeutic classes.  Country fixed effects 
are also included in some of the probit estimations – as indicated in the column headings – and in 
the hazard estimations.  Their inclusion implies the loss of all information available from cross-
country variation in the key policy variables; but focusing on within-country changes over time 
has  the  advantage  of  controlling  for  any  unobserved  market  characteristics  that  might  be 
correlated with those variables.  Appendix Table A4 indicates the countries that saw changes in 
their policy variables during relevant time periods.  Time, therapy class, and (where included) 
country fixed effects are each jointly significant in all cases.  Where country fixed effects are not 
included in the model, the estimations allow for a country random effect.  
Explanatory variables are dated by the year of the first global launch.  For example, if an 
NCE is first marketed in 1990 then it is a country’s population size in the year 1990 that is 
considered as a determinant of drug launch in the period two or ten years after 1990. This is not 
obviously the right assumption – one might expect that the relevant characteristics would be 
those for a later period, particularly for the probability of launch within ten years.  However, 
experimentation  showed  that  both  policy  and  market  variables  dated  after  the  global  launch 
(either two or four years) have weaker explanatory power in models of new product launch.  It   27 
may be that worldwide launch decisions for a new drug are taken at the time of first marketing 
and do not readily respond to subsequent changes in the policy environment. 
 
VI.  The Estimation Results 
  We now examine the determinants of drug launch.  Coefficient estimates on the patent 
regime and price control variables are discussed in detail, followed by a brief discussion of other 
estimates. 
Low- and Middle-income Countries 
Results of probit estimations for the low- and middle-income countries are presented in 
Tables 6 through 8, with corresponding hazard model estimates in Table 9.  
The  type  of  patent  protection  offered  by  a  country  in  this  income  grouping  is 
characterized by a set of five dummy variables (see the first rows of Table 6).   Information on 
the length of protection is collapsed into indicator variables for whether the statutory patent term 
is short vs. long.  This distinction has explanatory power whereas the specific term length in 
years does not.  While somewhat surprising, launch decisions are made by managers who must 
synthesize different types of information and it is quite plausible that the simpler breakdown is 
the way in which they think about country patent policies when making their choices.  
The first of the five dummy variables indicates whether a country offers at least short-
term process protection for pharmaceuticals versus no protection at all (see the diagram below). 
For the lower-income countries “short” refers to a statutory term of 14 years or less.
32  Recalling 
Figure  1,  a  term  of  14  years  would  imply  that,  on  average,  about  four  years  of  effective 
protection would be conveyed by a patent on the product molecule and perhaps a few more years  
                                                 
32   Experimenting sequentially with cutoffs from 12 to 17 years, 14 gave the highest pseudo-R











by associated process patents because of their later application dates.  Of the periods in which 
countries in the data offered a short term of protection, in about 25% of cases the term was 14 
years.  In about 50% the term was 12 years, implying an average effective patent life of only a 
few years.  In the remaining cases the term was just 7 years. 
The next two variables capture the incremental effect of moving to either to long process 
protection (￿ 15  years), or alternatively  adding short product protection.  The forth variable 
indicates the additional effect of going from short protection of both products and processes to 
long protection of both.  (One never observes a country with short product protection and long 
process  protection.)    The  final  dummy  variable  indicates  whether  the  country  will  grant  an 
extension on product patents to compensate for marketing time lost during the approvals process. 
  Table 6 presents results for the full set of drugs. The first model, shown in column one, 
includes  country  fixed  effects,  while  the  second  model  does  not.
  33    Because  the  latter 
                                                 
33 Because there is limited variation in the policy variables – particularly when country fixed 
effects are included – a jackknife procedure was used to look for potential overfitting of the data.  
Countries were dropped in turn, the model re-estimated and the resulting coefficient estimates 
checked for stability.   29 
specification includes the Gini coefficient as a control, a number of countries are lost due to 
missing information.  
The estimates are quite robust to the assumption of fixed or random country  effects, 
which lends empirical support to the argument that the set of policy variables can be treated as 
exogeneous.  As noted above, the decision whether to maintain an extensive price control system 
in the face of international corporate or governmental pressure is the policy choice most likely to 
be problematic.  To test whether endogeneity in this variable might be influencing the results, we 
also estimate a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood version of the model in column two 
that includes the residual from a first-stage regression for extensive price control (Rivers and 
Vuong,  1988).    Significant  instruments  in  the  first-stage  regression  include  the  economic 
orientation of the ruling executive party, its tenure in power, and the overall budget balance.
34  
First-stage estimates are provided in Appendix Table A5.  The exogeneity of the extensive price 
control  variable  in  the  probit  for  launch  is  not  rejected  (null  hypothesis  that  the  residual 
coefficient is zero: ￿
2(1) = 0.42, p-value = 0.52). The coefficients in the launch model change 
little so they are not reported. 
Given the historical link between changes in patent law and trade agreements, one might 
also be concerned that what looks like a positive role for stronger patents could be due to other 
changes in the trade regime facilitating market interaction.  To test this, annual exports was 
included as a control variable in unreported estimations.  Its inclusion had little effect on the 
estimated coefficients on the policy variables.  
                                                 
34  Budget  stress  could  increase  the  stringency  of  price  regulation  as  countries  that  cover 
pharmaceuticals though general expenditure strive to control costs (for many specific incidents in 
the  E.U.,  see  Jacobzone,  2000).    Because  it  could  conceivably  have  a  direct  effect  on  the 
government’s willingness to approve relatively expensive new drugs we also run the two-stage 
estimations dropping this variable.  The results are the same.     30 
  The observed probability that a drug is launched in a low- or middle-income country 
within two years is about 9%.   The estimates in Table 6 suggest that going from a regime with 
only short process patents to one with long process patents significantly encourages rapid entry.  
A  long  process  patent  regime  still  allows  for  possible  generic  entry  and  this  appears  to  be 
important.  The marginal effect is to raise the probability of launch within two years by 2-3 
percentage points (or about 30%).   There is little evidence, however, that offering any form of 
protection to new pharmaceutical products enhances the likelihood of  quick entry into these 
markets. The individual incremental effects of adding short and then long product protection are 
insignificant in both specifications, and the joint marginal effect is weakly significant only in the 
random effects model (0.021 + 0.008, p-value 0.08).    
Extensive price control  clearly lowers the probability that new pharmaceuticals reach 
consumers quickly in lower-income countries, as expected.   The predicted effect is similar in 
magnitude to that of the change to a longer term on process patents – in this case lowering the 
probability  of  rapid  entry  by  some  30%.    That  a  country  has  an  essential  drugs  list  is  also 
associated with a lower likelihood that new drugs are launched quickly and may indicate more 
focused efforts by the government to ensure that drug purchases are cost effective.  Moderate 
price control, on the other hand, does not appear to have a significant influence on entry in these 
specifications.  
The first two columns of Table 7 present the main results for estimates when additional 
variables are included in the random effects specification.  The first adds a country’s R&D share 
and  its  level  of  tariff  protection  (which  together  lead  to  a  sizable  drop  in  the  number  of 
observations due to missing data).   We again find that having a long process patent regime 
significantly encourages rapid drug launch.  A new finding is that countries with a high technical   31 
capacity as measured by R&D expenditure are far less likely to see new pharmaceuticals in the 
market quickly.  Starting from no R&D and then increasing R&D to the mean level of one-half 
of one percent of GDP drops the probability of rapid launch by an estimated 13.6 percentage 
points.  This negative effect of local capacity, however, is significantly offset if a country offers 
the strongest level of patent protection.  Although the effect of a higher R&D share remains 
negative even when interacted with strong patent protection, its marginal effect is diminished by 
a third (joint marginal effect = -0.19, p-value = 0.01, versus -0.28).   
As in the simpler specification, extensive price control has a significant negative effect on 
the probability of rapid launch.  Moderate regulation of prices is also found to have a negative 
effect now that the specification allows for its interaction with GDP per capita. The impact of 
having any price regulation is sizable for the poorest countries, and is only fully absent at a GDP 
over $11,000, or higher than cutoff for this country group.  That price regulation has a larger 
effect in the poorest countries may reflect firm choices.  It might also result from low-income 
countries having less efficient regulatory procedures that slow price negotiations.   There is some 
suggestion  of  the  importance  of  variation  in  regulatory  efficiency  within  the  lower-income 
countries in the fact that the coefficient estimate on having a national formulary is significantly 
positive (which is not the case for the higher-income countries, see below).  One would expect its 
direct effect to be negative, but within the lower-income country group this variable may be 
acting as a proxy for bureaucratic competence. 
The specification shown in the second column of Table 7 includes interactions between 
short and long product patent variables and the indicator “Strong” that indicates limits on how 
patent rights can be curtailed. There is some weak evidence from these interactions that short 
product patents may encourage rapid entry when they are held in a legal environment more   32 
generally supportive of patentee rights.  It may be, for example, that in such an environment the 
patent holder feels able to simply import product rather than go through the time consuming 
process of finding local producers and/or distributors to license.  
  The third and forth columns of Table 7 correspond to the same random effect model as in 
column 2 of Table 6, but for the NCE subsets indicated in the column headings.  As found for all 
drugs, the NCE most relevant to poor countries (“LDC concentrated”) are more likely to be 
launched quickly when a country offers only long process patent protection.  In addition, for this 
subset of NCE there is also evidence that offering long protection on pharmaceutical products 
can encourage rapid entry.  The incremental effect of long product protection is positive and 
weakly significant and the estimated coefficient on having a patent term extension provision is 
both significant and sizable.  Results for the other policy variables are similar to those for all 
drugs.   
  The last set of estimates given in Table 7 is for the high revenue “blockbuster” drugs.  
For a low- and middle-income country the probability that one of these drugs is launched within 
two years is considerable higher than is the probability for all NCE (24% vs. 9%).  That said, 
there is no evidence that offering any form of patent protection – whether long or short – speeds 
the arrival of the worlds’ blockbuster drugs to their markets.  This finding does not seem to be an 
artifact of the smaller sample size, since other estimations showing significant effects of the 
patent variables have even smaller sample sizes.   Further, the other policy variables remain 
significant and are estimated to have a similar-sized effect on the launch of blockbusters (relative 
to the observed probability) as they do for other sets of NCE.  
   Table 8 compares results for the probability of launch within two years (“rapid”) and ten 
years  (“ever”)  using  only  NCE  launched  globally  by  1992  in  both  cases  so  as  to  enable   33 
comparisons across a common sample of drugs.  Considering first the within 2 year results, as in 
the full period data there is evidence that a long process patent regime – possibly supporting 
generic entry – is conducive to rapid drug launch.  However, unlike in the full period data, in this 
earlier subset of NCE a long patent regime also including products – possibly encouraging entry 
by innovator firms – gives significant support to rapid entry.   Both patent regimes offering a 
long period of protection are estimated to have similar-sized marginal effects: 0.086 without 
product patents and 0.070 when products are included (as compared to a short process-only 
regime).   Interestingly, the R&D share and its interaction are not significant in the earlier time 
period.  The fact that we observe less benefit from product patents in the full period data and a 
more negative effect associated with local R&D activity (compare Tables 6, 7 and 8) may be due 
to  innovator  firms  feeling  increasingly  less  able  to  make  use  of  patent  rights  in  developing 
countries to protect against local competition.  
Policy choices have remarkably different effects on whether drugs are “ever” launched.  
Contrary to the finding for rapid launch, there is only weak evidence that moving from a short to 
a long process patent regime increases the likelihood of a drug being marketed ever.  Instead, 
there is a significant benefit in the longer term associated with giving short-term protection to 
innovative products, increasing the estimated probability that a drug is ever launched in a lower-
income country by 7.5 percentage points or 25%.    
Most interestingly, there is a significant, sizable, and now positive benefit associated with 
having local technical capacity.  Moving from no local research activity to the mean R&D share 
in this sample of 0.38 increases the probability that a new NCE is ever launched in a country by 
an estimated 9.7 percentage points or 32%.  Further, in contrast to our finding for rapid launch 
that strong patent protection partially and positively offsets the harmful effect of local capacity,   34 
when it comes to the question of whether new drugs are ever marketed, we find that strong patent 
protection negatively offsets the otherwise beneficial effect of having local capacity.  Further, the 
offset is no longer partial.  The joint marginal effect of R&D capacity when combined with 
extensive IP protection is a statistically insignificant 0.07 (p-value 0.256).  Consistent with this 
contrast in the direction of effects across time lags, we also find here that offering a patent term 
extension has a weakly significant negative effect on whether new drugs are ever launched, 
whereas for rapid launch this policy was found to be either insignificant or positive.    
One  surprise  in  Table  8  is  that  price  regulation,  which  has  a  large  and  consistently 
negative effect on the likelihood that a drug is launched quickly, is estimated to have a weakly 
positive effect on whether drugs are ever launched.   This is difficult to explain either as a direct 
effect, or as the result of policy endogeneity, both of which would give a negative effect.  Nor is 
it consistent with the idea that regulators lower price demands if firms hold out long enough to 
entice them into the market, since such behavior would, at best, make regulation neutral.  At the 
very least, it does not appear that price regulation is severely limiting the ultimate entry of new 
products. 
Taken together, the findings in column two of Table 8 suggest that innovator firms are an 
important source of drug entry (hence product patents matter for eventual launch) and that these 
firms are willing to enter poorer markets at low prices with only a few years of effective patent 
protection – after some delay.  They also suggest that local firms can be a significant source of 
market entry, and that their ability to actively enter could be slowed by stronger patent rights.  
Given this, unless speed of access is paramount, a lower-income country would not seem to 
benefit  in  terms  of  greater  product  availability  from  offering  a  long  term  of  product  patent 
protection or from limiting its price control regulation.   35 
   Finally, Table 9 presents hazard model estimates.  There are in an accelerated failure 
time form which means that a negative coefficient is associated with shorter launch lags and thus 
corresponds to a positive coefficient in the probit estimations.  The hazard model summarizes the 
effect of policy on launch behavior at all monthly lags after global launch and thus incorporates - 
within  a  specific  structure  –  both  the  “within  two  year”  and  “within  ten  year”  launch 
probabilities.  Thus it is not surprising to see in the first column of Table 9 that both increasing 
the term on process patents and making short protection available on new products speed drug 
launch.
35  We find that while extensive price regulation slows launch, moderate price regulation, 
on average, has no effect in this group of low- and middle-income countries. 
High-income Countries 
There is less variation in the patent regimes observed in the high-income countries.  For 
example, all of the countries in this group offered at least protection on pharmaceutical processes 
over most of the period.   Thus, for this group of countries the set of indicator variables is limited 
to  three:  a  dummy  for  whether  a  country  protects  pharmaceutical  products,  another  for  the 
incremental effect of having a long statutory term on either form of protection, and finally a 
dummy variable indicating whether a patent term extension is available.   For this group of 
countries, “Short” refers to a statutory term of less than 20 years, the distinction preferred by the 
data. 
The estimations in Table 10 for the high-income countries and the full set of NCE follow 
the same format as Table 6.  For this set of countries the estimates on the policy variables are less 
                                                 
35 From Table 8 it is clear that a model allowing for changes in the relative effect of policy 
variables  at  different  lags  would  be  desirable.    A  Cox  proportionate  hazard  specification 
accommodates this easily but the underlying proportionality assumption is resoundingly rejected 
by the data.   36 
robust to the choice of fixed or random country effects (compare models one and two).
36  It may 
be that the policy variables are picking up some the effect of other country level characteristics in 
the  random  effects  specification.    However,  it  is  also  the  case  that  among  the  high-income 
countries there is more limited within-country variation in the policy variables (see Table A4). 
As  a  result  the  countries  contributing  to  the  estimation  of  policy  effects  across  the  two 
specifications are quite different and this makes some divergence in the point estimates less 
surprising.    We  also  test  formally,  as  above,  the  hypothesis  that  the  extensive  price  control 
variable is exogeneous and again cannot reject the null (￿
2(1) = 0.84, p-value = 0.36).  First-stage 
estimates are in Appendix Table A5. 
The results in Table 10 consistently indicate that adding the protection of new products to 
an otherwise “Short” patent regime gives the greatest incremental boost to rapid market entry.   
For the specification with country fixed effects, shown in column one, we also find a significant 
additional benefit from moving to a longer patent term.  However, in no specification is there any 
evidence that having a drug patent extension affects the market entry of new pharmaceuticals 
within high-income countries.  
All price regulation – whether moderate or extensive – tends to reduce the probability 
that a drug is launched in a high-income country within two years.  However, as for the poorer 
countries, the effect of moderate price regulation depends on the income level of a country.  The 
estimates here indicate that moderate price control no longer lowers the probability of rapid entry 
once a country reaches a GDP per capita of about $12,088, slightly below the median level for 
the group. 
                                                 
36 However, the standard errors are sizable so the estimates are statistically indistinguishable at 
conventional levels.   37 
The first column of Table 11 contains estimation results for the “high quality” subset of 
NCE using the country fixed-effects specification.  The overall probability of a high quality drug 
being launched within 2 years is over fifty percent higher than for an average NCE (33% vs. 
20%).    As  for  all  drugs,  short-term  product  patent  protection  encourages  the  launch  of 
blockbusters.  In contrast to all drugs, however, there is no incremental benefit from having the 
longest term of protection.  Having any price control lowers the likelihood of entry and extensive 
price control is particularly problematic. The latter lowers the probability of rapid launch by 10.7 
percentage points, or 33%. 
The last results in Table 11 are within 2 and within 10 year estimates for the early (1982-
92) period NCE.  Because of the limited within-country variation in the policy variables during 
this shorter period, we use the random effects specification corresponding to column three in 
Table 10. 
A  high-income  country  increases  the  probability  that  new  drugs  are  available  to  its 
consumers  quickly  by  offering  at  least  short-term  protection  to  pharmaceutical  products,  as 
before, but for this early period there is an even larger incremental effect from moving to a 
longer term of protection (column 2).  Moderate price control is weakly significant and extensive 
price control significantly diminishes the likelihood of rapid entry. 
When considering whether drugs are “ever” launched in the high-income countries both 
patents and price regulation continue to have a role.  In this longer time span, however, it is only 
long-term patent protection that is found to make a positive contribution.  Recall from Figure 1 
that later market entry implies a shorter effective patent life.  Thus, the statutory term may need 
to be long if it is to create a period of exclusivity sufficient to allow a firm to cover the higher 
costs of entry into high-income countries.  It is somewhat surprising, then, to continue to find   38 
that offering a patent term extension has no discernible effect on eventual market entry nor on its 
timing.   Finally, and again as we found for the poorer countries, extensive price control is far 
less damaging to the likelihood that a drug is ever launched than it is to the likelihood that it is 
launched quickly.   
Maintaining an essential drugs list was found to have a significant dampening effect on 
market entry in the poorer countries in most specifications.  We see the same negative effect 
within  the  high-income  countries  when  considering  all  drugs,  and  of  a  similar  relative 
magnitude.  Having a national formulary is also associated with less rapid entry.  Finally there is 
some evidence that the establishment of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency in 1995 as a 
centralized  mechanism  for  obtaining  marketing  approvals  within  Europe  has  succeeded  in 
speeding access to new drugs for consumers there.  In specifications where the estimated effect 
of the EMEA is significant it is also large – increasing the probability of launch within 2 years by 
25-30%. 
Income Distribution and Demographic Characteristics 
As one would expect, having a larger population and higher level of GDP per capita 
increases the likelihood that a country will have more drugs on the market and that they will 
become available quickly.  In the estimations that include the Gini coefficient as a measure of 
income  inequality,  we  find  that  the  distribution  of  income  is  always  also  a  significant 
determinant of market entry. The Gini coefficient, and its interaction with the log of GDP per 
capita, are statistically significant and show a pronounced pattern across the two income groups.   
As noted in the introduction, when an innovator firm considers launching products in one of the 
poorer countries, it may follow a strategy of setting low prices with small profit margins in an 
attempt to achieve extensive market penetration.  Alternatively it may opt for higher prices with   39 
the expectation of reaching just the top of the market.  We find that a lower-income country is 
more likely to get new drugs if it is unequal – ensuring that it has a wealthy “elite”.  On the other 
hand, a high-income country is better off with a more equal distribution as this generates the 
largest “middle class”.   Equality becomes less important as average income increases.  These 
findings are consistent with the idea that there is a threshold level of income that makes an 
individual a potential consumer of new drugs.  For countries with an average income below that 
threshold, inequality increases market size.  For those above, inequality decreases market size – 
unless average income is so high that even when it is unequally distributed most consumers are 
above the threshold. 
The  age  composition  of  a  country’s  population  also  appears  as  a  very  significant 
determinant of the speed and extent of drug launch.   In the low- and middle-income countries, 
drugs are more likely to reach the market in countries with many children and those with a high 
proportion of elderly.  In the high- income countries, having a larger proportion of children 
seems to be most important. 
 
VII.  Policy Simulations 
This  section  gives  a  sense  of  the  empirical  implications  of  the  econometric  results 
discussed above. Table 12 gives the predicted probability that a drug arrives in a given country 
market within two years of its global launch.  The predictions are for 1995 and the anti-infectives 
therapy class.  They are based on the estimation of country fixed-effects models, using the high 
quality NCE for the high-income countries (Table 10, column 1) and the blockbuster sample for 
the low- and middle-income countries (unreported).  The columns on the left hand side indicate a 
range of different policy choices, while those on the right show how the predicted probabilities   40 
vary with these choices.  The last row gives selected estimated standard errors – to give a sense 
of the precision of the predictions.  Because the predictions are highly correlated across rows 
within a given column, and across columns within income groups, these should not be used to 
formally assess the statistical significance of differences.  Bold typeface indicates changes that 
are significant. 
The first three rows change the patent regime, while the last three rows change price 
regulation.   It is apparent from this table that a country’s choices regarding intellectual property 
and price regulation can have a substantial impact on the likelihood that new pharmaceuticals are 
available to consumers quickly. In both lower- and high-income countries there appears to be 
scope to alter the probabilities by some 20-30% or more by virtue of these policy decisions. 
Figure 5 presents this finding in another form using the hazard model estimates in Table 
9.  It gives predicted cumulative hazard rates for India.  Each line represents the time path of 
market launches assuming different combinations of intellectual property and price control (PC) 
policies.  As in Table 12, the predictions are for 1995 and the anti-infectives therapy class.  The 
pair of policies indicated in the top row change the patent term, while the pair in the second row 
change the degree of price regulation.  These two changes generate similar-sized shifts in the 
cumulative hazard curves. 
  The vertical axis indicates the predicted share of drugs launched in the given market by 
the lag indicated on the horizontal axis.  Considering the upper dashed and dotted lines that 
overlay each other, for example, we see that if India were to have some price control and also 
offer long (￿ 15 years) patent protection, a predicted 20% of all NCE would be marketed there 
within about five years of their global launch dates.   Suppose that India then kept the longer 
term of patent protection but moved to more extensive price regulation (the lower solid line).    41 
One can ask the question: how many fewer drugs would arrive within five years with the new 
policy?  Looking vertically at five years, the answer is that just 15% of all drugs – rather than the 
previous 20% - would be launched within this period as a result of the change in policy.  One can 
also ask the question: with the new policy, how much longer would it take for 20% of all drugs 
to be launched?  Looking horizontally, the answer is that it would take some six and a half years 
– rather than five – as a result of the change in policy.  Irrespective of policy regime, ten years 
after global launch no more than 40% of all drugs are predicted to be on the Indian market. 
 
VII.   Concluding Comments 
  Much attention has been paid to how price controls and the patent system determine 
pharmaceutical prices.  We find that countries’ choices about how to regulate pharmaceutical 
prices  and  protect  innovation  also  have  a  significant  influence  on  whether  drugs  become 
available  to  their  consumers  and  how  quickly.    Short-term  patent  protection  that  includes 
products, or long protection only of manufacturing processes, are both patent regimes that tend to 
encourage more or faster launches in the developing world.  Increasing the strength of a patent 
system to include long-term protection on pharmaceutical products appears to spur market entry 
– among the high-income countries.  For the low- and middle-income countries that are currently 
being  encouraged  to  move  to  stronger  protection  through  trade  policy,  the  evidence  that 
extending protection enhances access to new pharmaceuticals is mixed.  There is some evidence 
that high levels of protection might encourage more frequent entry of innovative products in the 
short term, particularly in countries where multinationals might otherwise hesitate because local 
technical capacity might create competitive pressures.  On the other hand, in the longer term that 
same  domestic  capacity  could  be  an  alternative  source  of  entry,  and  we  find  that a  country   42 
offering extensive patent protection may lose the benefits of that activity and have fewer new 
products in the market overall as a result.  
The fact that patent laws in the low- and middle-income countries are shown to matter at 
all is also of significance.  Intellectual property holders frequently assert that the poor quality of 
enforcement in developing countries undermines the value of their patent rights. With the patent 
variables significant in various estimations, and entering with different and plausible patterns 
across subsets of the NCE, it is evident that patent laws in these countries are at least broadly 
meaningful.   
Like intellectual property, the standard argument regarding price regulation – that it will 
dissuade market entry – appears to have more relevance among the high-income countries.  For 
these countries, extensive price control is always found to lower the probability of market entry, 
and moderate regulation appears to do likewise, even in the long run.  Not so for the poorer 
countries.  There we find that while price regulation makes it less likely that new drugs will be 
available quickly, it does not appear to prevent new products from being launched eventually.   
  As they stand these results might temper some of the arguments made in the course of 
future  international  negotiations.    Interpreting  what  they  imply  for  public  health  and  social 
welfare will require further analysis.  If, for example, ten percent of new drugs are no longer 
marketed in a country due to a policy change, this may be damaging or not depending on what 
was in that ten percent.   Pharmaceuticals often have acceptable substitutes, and some “lifestyle” 
drugs may not be of great medicinal importance.  Future research will explore the therapeutic 
significance of the pharmaceuticals that are launched slowly, or not at all, and the extent to 
which this failure is associated with there being substitutes available in the market.   43 
A very poor country may also be quite willing to accept some delay in the arrival of 
innovative new pharmaceuticals as a result of regulation if it means that the drugs are priced 
within reach of more of the population when they finally reach the market. With cross-country 
data on product prices, this tradeoff could be assessed.  Finally, giving innovators the strongest 
patent  protection  might  be  viewed  as  worthwhile  irrespective  of  its  effect  on  entry,  on  the 
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Table 1 










     
1982  4  36 
1983  4  29 







1986  10  45 
1987  9  55 
1988  7  43 







1991  5  39 
1992  4  43 
1993  6  37 







1996  13  42 
1997  13  43 
1998  13  39 








Note: Blockbuster drugs are NCE among 
the top 200 drugs in terms of world revenue 
in 1998 or 2003 or among the top 100 in 
U.S. revenue in 1993 or 1995.  
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Table 2 










Pct. Of First 
Launches 
(Adjusted Share) 
High Income Countries       
AUSTRALIA  3  21  0.28 
AUSTRIA  12  21  1.28 
BELGIUM  6  21  0.54 
CANADA  10  21  1.02 
DENMARK  18  21  1.82 
FINLAND  12  21  1.19 
FRANCE  44  21  4.38 
GERMANY  74  21  7.36 
GREECE  1  21  0.10 
HONG KONG  1  21  0.09 
IRELAND  15  21  1.53 
ISRAEL  1  21  0.10 
ITALY  61  21  6.08 
JAPAN  231  21  23.99 
NETHERLANDS  26  21  2.89 
NEW ZEALAND  7  19  0.80 
NORWAY  6  10  1.33 
PORTUGAL  3  21  0.30 
PUERTO RICO  16  9  3.68 
SINGAPORE  6  19  0.70 
SPAIN  23  21  2.38 
SWEDEN  26  21  2.66 
SWITZERLAND  36  21  3.67 
UK  72  21  7.30 
USA  163  21  16.95 
Upper Income Countries       
ARGENTINA  7  21  0.72 
BOLIVIA  1  11  0.24 
BRAZIL  3  21  0.26 
CHILE  1  21  0.10 
CZECH REPUBLIC  1  10  0.20 
MALAYSIA  5  21  0.53 
MEXICO  16  21  1.66 
POLAND  1  11  0.20 
SOUTH AFRICA  6  21  0.65 
SOUTH KOREA  1  15  0.11 
TURKEY  1  21  0.09 
VENEZUELA  6  21  0.58 
Lower Income Countries       
COLOMBIA  1  21  0.07 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  1  17  0.10 
PERU  1  21  0.12 
PHILIPPINES  4  21  0.45 
RUSSIA  2  8  0.56 
THAILAND  2  21  0.19 
Low Income Countries       
BANGLADESH  1  10  0.19 
FRENCH WEST AFRICA  2  11  0.40 
PAKISTAN  1  21  0.08 
Note: Total number of drugs launched = 836; launched 1995-2001 = 337.   47 
 
Figure 2


























































Note: This figure includes the 300 drugs first launched 1/82 through 12/88. 
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Table 3  
Launch Lags for NCEs that were First Marketed 1986-1992 
(Months) 
 
    Percentiles      Percentiles 
Country  # Drugs  10
th  Median  90
th  Country  # Drugs  10
th  Median  90
th 
High Income          Upper Income         
AUSTRALIA  28  15  46.5  111  ARGENTINA  49  8  36  110 
AUSTRIA  46  12  28.5  73  BRAZIL  43  22  52  131 
BELGIUM  40  6.5  23  90.5  CHILE  39  13  41  104 
CANADA  34  4  32.5  69  LEBANON  26  46  106  157 
DENMARK  40  0.5  18  68  MALAYSIA  26  26  50.5  138 
FINLAND  38  11  27.5  85  MEXICO  44  8  29  102 
FRANCE  41  0  19  62  POLAND  6  34  43.5  98 
GERMANY  54  0  18.5  45  SAUDI ARABIA  29  32  51  107 
GREECE  44  13  37  120  SOUTH AFRICA  37  10  30  100 
HONG KONG  37  13  27  88  SOUTH KOREA  53  24  49  110 
IRELAND  38  0  22.5  88  TAIWAN  5  55  83  116 
ISRAEL  29  28  52  102  TURKEY  40  23  55.5  95 
ITALY  57  0  24  74  VENEZUELA  38  17  35.5  115 
JAPAN  77  0  0  85  Lower Income         
NETHERLANDS  47  4  22  49  CENTRAL AMERICA  43  18  46  136 
NEW ZEALAND  36  5  26.5  79  COLOMBIA  42  17  44.5  104 
PORTUGAL  33  20  49  88 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC  35  25  49  111 
SINGAPORE  33  18  45  109  ECUADOR  37  20  55  118 
SPAIN  37  18  30  111  EGYPT  30  37  73.5  133 
SWEDEN  46  0  17  86  LATVIA  20  63  99.5  142 
SWITZERLAND  46  2  14  66  MOROCCO  29  14  45  140 
UK  50  0  16  51  PERU  36  24  57.5  159 
USA  46  0  20  69  PHILIPPINES  49  6  35  98 
          THAILAND  48  16  41.5  99 
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Table 3:  Continued 
 
    Percentiles 
Country  # Drugs  10
th  Median  90
th 
Low Income         
FRENCH WEST AFRICA  10  19  47  131 
INDIA  14  46  58  84 
INDONESIA  42  22  43  97 
PAKISTAN  38  23  57  118 
         
(Unweighted) Means         
High Income  42.5  7.4  26.8  81.2 
Upper Middle Income  33.5  24.5  50.9  114.1 
Lower Middle Income  36.9  24.0  54.7  123.9 
Low Income  26.0  27.5  51.3  107.5 
 
Notes:  The sample includes the 122 NCE from the therapy classes A2B,  
C, J for which Indian data are available and, for a given country, only those 
NCE first marketed after the country entered the database. 
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Table 4:  The Arrival of New Drugs 
 
Percent Released: 
   
Percentage Marketed - Years After Global Launch: 
  Upper  Block- 
All  Bound  Buster    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
25%  28%  67%  AUSTRALIA  5%  18%  39%  57%  68%  74%  83%  88%  98% 
38  43  81  AUSTRIA  13  30  51  66  74  83  87  94  98 
31  36  67  BELGIUM  19  40  61  72  79  85  91  94  97 
30  35  81  CANADA  19  34  56  65  78  89  91  96  97 
36  39  81  DENMARK  26  48  65  75  84  89  93  95  97 
33  37  78  FINLAND  11  33  54  67  74  80  87  93  96 
37  43  71  FRANCE  35  49  62  70  79  85  91  94  100 
44  57  86  GERMANY  32  60  75  83  87  91  94  98  94 
34  36  84  GREECE  6  23  41  56  69  78  85  91  97 
29  33  73  HONG KONG  13  37  62  70  76  79  86  93  97 
32  36  75  IRELAND  28  50  60  69  77  83  88  94  98 
26  30  75  ISRAEL  3  17  27  52  69  74  83  93  98 
49  54  82  ITALY  33  46  60  71  78  86  92  95  97 
53  59  68  JAPAN  64  68  73  78  83  88  91  93  98 
37  42  79  NETHERLANDS  31  53  68  79  84  90  92  94  94 
28  30    NEW ZEALAND  20  41  53  65  72  81  86  91  97 
29  34  69  PORTUGAL  11  23  40  47  65  76  84  91  98 
26  26  56  SINGAPORE  14  35  53  66  76  82  89  95  96 
36  40  80  SPAIN  12  28  48  61  70  78  85  92  98 
34  37  78  SWEDEN  30  48  57  70  76  83  88  94  96 
36  48  80  SWITZERLAND  35  56  70  79  83  87  90  92  98 
40  45  84  UK  44  60  72  79  86  91  95  97  98 
38  46  90  USA  34  48  62  71  78  89  93  94  93 
42 
 
47  84 
 
ARGENTINA  13  27  44  60  70  76  80  84  92 
32  36  76  BRAZIL  7  20  34  50  62  70  76  85  95 
30  35  77  CHILE  7  25  43  53  65  74  83  91  99 
22  24  55  MALAYSIA  13  33  56  76  83  88  91  94  98 
35  38  79  MEXICO  14  33  47  60  73  81  87  93  95 
23  26  70  SAUDI ARABIA  1  5  16  33  50  65  75  89  98 
29  31  74  SOUTH AFRICA  15  35  53  63  69  77  84  91  96 
31  34  81  TURKEY  1  10  24  35  52  64  76  88  94 




35  82 
 
CENTRAL 
AMERICA  3  19  35  46  63  72  81  88  97 
31  35  82  COLOMBIA  6  15  30  47  59  67  79  85  91 
27  30  74  ECUADOR  3  10  25  35  53  67  78  82  90 
19  21  62  EGYPT  0  2  7  19  29  48  63  74  94 
25  28  67  PERU  3  11  26  37  51  62  73  80  93 
36  44  81  PHILIPPINES  8  25  44  58  67  74  83  86  93 
34  35  80  THAILAND  5  23  41  55  63  71  80  88  96 
26 
 
28  75 
 
INDONESIA  0  9  30  45  57  68  80  88  92 
26  28  66  PAKISTAN  2  10  18  34  49  61  69  78  95% 
 
Notes:  “Percent Released” is the share of global NCE launched in the row country within 10 years.  “Upper Bound” 
assumes all observations with missing ingredient information are NCEs and grosses up the total launches accordingly.  
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Table 5  
Percent of NCE Launches 1982-92 done by “First” Firm 




















All Drugs    54.8% 
  (5,430) 
  67.5% 
  (332) 
  68.0% 
  (842) 
  71.7% 
  (2,963) 
  61.6% 
  (9,567) 
Blockbusters 
 
  65.6 
  (1,154) 
  75.1 
  (189) 
  72.2 
  (461) 
  76.9 
  (1,577) 
  72.3 
  (3,381) 
 
Notes: The “first” firm is defined as the one making the first launch in a high-income country.  The 
number of observations in each cell is in parentheses.  A “short” patent regime is one with a statutory 
term of less than 15 years. 
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Figure 4: Timing of Launch
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Table 6:  Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
Probability of Launch within Two Years 
 
With Country Fixed Effects 
 











Short process patent 
  (< 15 years) 
 
  -0.010 
 
  0.011 
 
  -0.011 
 
  0.010 
   Add long process  
     (only)  patents  
    
   0.034 
   
  0.015 
   
   0.033 
 
  0.016 
   Add short product   
     patents (< 15 years) 
 
   0.010 
 
  0.015 
 
   0.021 
 
  0.014 
      Add long process &   
        product patents  
    
   0.006 
   
  0.012 
    
   0.008 
   
  0.009 
 
Some price control 
 
  -0.005 
 
  0.012 
 
   0.014 
   
  0.011 
Extensive price control    -0.028    0.010    -0.029    0.013 
 
Essential Drug List 
 
  -0.017 
 
  0.007 
 
  -0.017* 
 
  0.009* 
 
Other Variables 
       
Health expenditure share 
     Of GDP 1995/97 
       
   0.272 
 
  0.246 
Private share of all 
     Health expenditure 
     
   0.041* 
 
  0.022* 
LnPopulation    -0.257    0.120     0.024    0.005 
LnGDPcapita    -0.063    0.020     0.109    0.028 
Gini Coefficient         0.016    0.006 
Gini*LnGDPcapita        -0.002    0.0007 
Pct 65 yrs +      0.877    1.746     0.567    0.265 
Pct 15-64 yrs     0.219    0.246    -0.279    0.119 
Population Growth        -0.401    0.430 
GDP Growth         0.022    0.056 
Radios per capita 1990        -0.004    0.003 
Growth Radios 90-95        -0.004    0.005 
Doctors/1000 in 1990         0.011    0.005 
Growth Doctors 90-95        -0.0007    0.002 
No. Obs./ Observed P  19901/0.089 
Pseudo R




Notes:  All specifications control for year of first launch and therapy class. Huber-White 
robust estimated standard errors allow for heteroscedasticity; and intra-country correlation in 
the disturbances in specifications without country fixed effects. Bold typeface and * indicate 
coefficients  significant  at  a  =  0.05  and  0.10,  respectively.  Marginal  effects  estimated  at 
variables means (all data) and for a discrete change in the case of dummy variables.  As a 
result of missing inequality information, Lebanon, Puerto Rico, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan are 
dropped in estimations without country FE. 
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Table 7:  Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
Probability of Launch within Two Years 
 



















Short process patent 
  (< 15 years) 
 
  -0.013 
 
  0.016 
 
  -0.003 
 
  0.011 
 
   0.004 
 
  0.019 
 
  -0.031 
 
  0.034 
   Add long process  
     (only)  patents  
 
   0.021 
 
  0.012 
 
   0.021* 
 
  0.013* 
 
   0.041 
   
  0.024 
 
   0.044 
 
  0.039 
   Add short product   
     patents (< 15 years) 
 
  -0.001  
 
  0.013 
 
   0.003 
 
  0.015 
 
   0.002 
 
  0.021 
 
   0.048 
  
  0.044 
   Add short * strong         0.053*    0.030*            
      Add long process &   
        product patents  
 
  -0.012 
 
  0.019 
 
   0.018 
 
  0.014 
 
   0.024* 
 
  0.014* 
   
   0.034 
 
  0.036 
      Add long p & p 
        *  strong 
     
  -0.045 
 
  0.031 
        
Drug patent extension    -0.010    0.009     0.011    0.011     0.057    0.017     0.001    0.030 
R&D share    -0.279    0.100             
long p & p * R&D share      0.093    0.046             
 
Some price control 
 
  -0.466 
 
  0.232 
 
  -0.172 
 
  0.092 
 
  -0.265 
 
  0.121 
 
  -0.587 
 
  0.164 
Extensive price control    -0.027    0.007    -0.034    0.010    -0.047    0.018    -0.123    0.035 
Some price control    
     * lnGDPcapita 
 
   0.050 
 
  0.020 
 
   0.023 
   
  0.011 
 
   0.033 
 
  0.013 
 
   0.088 
 
  0.028 
Tariff rate    -0.003    0.001             
 
Essential Drug List 
  
  -0.037 
 




  0.009 
 
  -0.038 
 
  0.015 
 
  -0.093 
 
  0.029 
Standard Treatment  
     Guidelines 
 
   0.017 
 
  0.014 
 
   0.035 
 
  0.011 
 
   0.074 
 
  0.019 
 
   0.117 
 
  0.037 
National Formulary     0.027    0.013     0.015    0.008     0.023    0.009     0.061    0.029 
No. Obs./ Observed P  12828/0.097  17917/0.091  4499/0.110  4046/0.238 
Pseudo R
2  0.155  0.136  0.181  0.216 
Notes:  See notes to Table 1 and 6.  All specifications control for year of first launch and therapy class.  “LDC Concentrated” includes only NCE 




Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
Probability of Launch within Two and Ten Years 
  Within 2  Within 10 
 









  Short process patent   
(< 15 years) 
 
  -0.003 
 
   0.020 
 
  -0.012 
 
  0.035 
   Add long process  
     (only)  patents  
 
   0.086 
 
   0.020 
 
   0.035* 
 
  0.019* 
   Add short product   
     patents (< 15 years) 
 
   0.018* 
 
   0.010* 
 
   0.075 
 
  0.022 
      Add long process &   
        product patents  
 
   0.052 
 
   0.033 
 
   0.035 
 
  0.041 
Drug patent extension    -0.009     0.014    -0.051*    0.026* 
R&D share     0.055     0.073     0.255    0.100 
long p & p * R&D share     -0.095     0.075    -0.185*    0.105* 
 
Some price control 
 
  -0.002 
 
   0.129 
 
   0.402* 
 
  0.220* 
Extensive price control    -0.018*     0.011*     0.040*    0.024* 
Some price control  * 
lnGDPcapita 
 
  -0.0002 
 
   0.016 
 
  -0.038 
 
  0.026 
 
Essential Drug List 
 
  -0.024 
 
   0.023 
 
  -0.075* 
   
  0.042* 
Standard Treatment  
     Guidelines 
 
   0.025 
 
   0.022 
 
   0.089 
 
  0.041 
National Formulary     0.045     0.013     0.032    0.029 
No. Obs./Observed P  7099/0.057  6963/0.303 
Pseudo R
2  0.089  0.051 
 
Notes: See notes to Tables 6 and 7.  These estimations include only NCE first launched in 
1992 or earlier. 
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Table 9: Hazard Estimations 
Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
 












Short process patent  (< 15 years) 
 
   0.066 
 
  0.103 
 
   0.144 
 
  0.112 
   Add long process  
     (only)  patents  
 
  -0.226 
  
  0.103 
 
  -0.208* 
 
  0.111* 
   Add short product  
     patents (< 15 years) 
 
  -0.243 
 
  0.121 
 
  -0.125 
 
  0.127 
      Add long process &   
        product patents  
  
   0.053 
   
  0.095 
 
   0.022 
 
  0.101 
Drug patent extension    -0.003    0.094    -0.052    0.107 
 
Some price control 
 
   0.133 
 
  0.103 
 
   0.024 
 
  0.115 
Extensive price control     0.343    0.097     0.345    0.108 
 
Essential Drug List 
 
   0.111* 
 
  0.061* 
 
   0.065 
 
  0.063 
Standard Treatment Guidelines     0.020    0.070     0.100    0.073 
 
Control Variables 
       
LnPopulation     3.466    1.023     3.182    1.130 
LnConsumption     0.526    0.178     0.154    0.188 
Pct 65 yrs +     22.823*   13.239*    24.838   14.982 
Pct 15-64 yrs 
 
  ￿ 
  ￿ 
  -6.303 
 
   0.556 
   3.275 
  1.996 
 
  0.012 
  0.160 
  -5.719 
 
   0.481 
   0.214 
  2.210 
 
  0.012 








Notes:  See notes to Tables 1 and 6. Both specifications use a log-logistic hazard function with a 
gamma distributed multiplicative factor to capture unobserved heterogeneity.  They include country, 
year, and therapy class fixed effects. 





Probability of Launch within Two Years 
 















Short product patents  
  (< 20 years) 
 
   0.091 
   
  0.013 
 
   0.050    
 
  0.020 
 
   0.057 
 
  0.020 
   Add long process   
    and/or product patents 
   0.031    0.013     0.064    0.039     0.059    0.045 
Drug patent extension             0.006    0.021 
 
Some price control 
 
  -0.038 
 
  0.014 
 
  -0.053 
 
  0.024 
 
  -0.667 
 
  0.243 
Extensive price control    -0.058    0.020    -0.127    0.025    -0.124    0.026 
Some price control  
     * lnGDPcapita 
       
    
 
   0.071* 
 
  0.036* 
 
Essential Drug List 
 
  -0.025 
 
  0.019 
 
  -0.068 
 
  0.017 
 
  -0.084 
 
  0.033 
Standard Treatment 
     Guidelines 
     
    
   
   0.029 
 
  0.086 
National Formulary            -0.039    0.026 
EMEA     0.034    0.017     0.026    0.042     0.041    0.043 
 
Other Variables 
           
Health expenditure share   
     Of GDP 1995/97 
     
  -2.602 
 
  1.012 
 
  -2.393 
 
  1.038 
Private share of all  
     health expenditure 
     
   0.205 
 
  0.178 
 
   0.184 
  
  0.179 
LnPopulation     0.436    0.129     0.041    0.006     0.043    0.006 
LnGDPcapita    -0.154    0.056    -0.673    0.346    -0.766    0.359 
Gini Coefficient        -0.256    0.111    -0.273    0.116 
Gini*LnGDPcapita         0.025    0.011     0.027    0.011 
Pct 65 yrs +     -3.519    0.470    -0.617    0.572    -0.534    0.628 
Pct 15-64 yrs    -0.544    0.382    -1.610    0.435    -2.097    0.477 
Population Growth        -1.781*    0.987*    -1.811    0.932 
GDP Growth         0.265    0.364     0.282    0.336 
Doctors/1000 in 1990        -0.008    0.015    -0.012    0.016 
Growth Doctors 90-95        -0.052    0.044    -0.047    0.044 
No. Obs./ Observed P  18889/0.205  15383/0.225  15383/0.225 
Pseudo R
2  0.104  0.090  0.091 
Notes:    See  notes  to  Table  6.    As  a  result  of  missing  inequality  information,  Kuwait,  New  Zealand, 




Probability of Launch 
 
  “High Quality Drugs”  All Drugs 




















Short product  
   patents (< 20 years) 
 
   0.188 
 
  0.025 
 
   0.042 
 
  0.013 
 
  -0.011 
 
  0.014 
   Add long process   
    and/or product patents 
 
   0.035 
 
  0.028 
 
   0.087 
 
  0.022 
   
   0.053     
  
  0.021 
Drug patent extension          -0.013    0.020     0.025    0.021 
 
Some price control 
 
  -0.056 
 
  0.029 
 
  -0.379* 
 
  0.172* 
 
  -0.638 
 
  0.128 
Extensive price control    -0.107    0.040    -0.095    0.017    -0.055*    0.029* 
Some price control  
     * lnGDPcapita 
 
 
   
   0.041* 
 
  0.023* 
 
   0.077 
 
  0.024 
 
Essential Drug List 
 
   0.005 
 
  0.039 
 
  -0.057 
 
  0.023 
 
  -0.089 
 
  0.019 
National Formulary        -0.022    0.018    -0.010    0.028 
EMEA     0.088    0.031         
No. Obs./ Observed P  7951/0.335  9258/0.166  9258/0.371 
Pseudo R
2  0.113  0.058  0.030 
 
Notes: See notes to Tables 6.  “High Quality” is the subset of NCE that are marketed in either the U.S. or the 
U.K. within 2 years of first global launch.  The U.S. and U.K. are not included in these estimations.  Results for 
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Table 12 
Predicted Probability of Launch within Two Years 
“Blockbuster” or “High Quality” Drugs 
 























No  No  Yes  No  55.7  16.6  25.8  27.2  34.3 
No  Yes  Yes  No  66.3  24.5  35.5     
Yes  Yes  Yes  No  71.6  29.5  41.2  54.5  64.2 
Yes  Yes  No  No  73.0  30.9  42.9  60.7  68.3 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  53.0  15.1  23.8  42.2  50.3 
 












Note:  All scenarios assume that at least short process patents are available.  “High Quality” (high-income group) and “Blockbuster” (low-
and middle-income group) are defined in notes to Tables 1 and 11.  The predictions given are based on a model with country fixed effects 
and use time-variant country characteristics for 1995, and the anti-infectives therapy class.  A “long” statutory term is > 14 years for Brazil, 
Egypt, and Thailand; > 19 years for France and Canada.  Bold typeface indicates comparisons that likely represent statistically significant 
differences. 
 






























2 4 6 8 10
Years following global launch
Some PC/Short process Some PC/Long process
Some PC/Long product Extensive PC/Long product
Estimated Share of Drugs Launched within Different Time Spans
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Table A1 
Launch Path for Ciprofloxacin 
Launch Within 2 
PHILIPPINES                                 10/1986 
GERMANY            2/1987 
UK             2/1987 
CENTRAL AMERICA                     9/1987 
FINLAND            9/1987 
AUSTRIA            9/1987 
 
USA           11/1987 
SWITZERLAND       11/1987 
CHILE         12/1987 
MEXICO         12/1987 
AUSTRALIA                         1/1988 
SWEDEN           2/1988 
NEW ZEALAND       3/1988 
DENMARK           4/1988 
JAPAN           7/1988 
INDONESIA            8/1988 
SPAIN           8/1988 
THAILAND            8/1988 
NETHERLANDS         9/1988 
PERU                      10/1988 
Launch Within 10 
HONG KONG                    11/1988 
GREECE         12/1988 
CANADA           1/1989 
ISRAEL           2/1989 
IRELAND           4/1989 
ARGENTINA           4/1989 
ITALY           5/1989 
COLOMBIA          5/1989 
ECUADOR           6/1989 
TURKEY            6/1989 
PORTUGAL           8/1989 
BRAZIL            9/1989 
VENEZUELA                       9/1989 
 
FRANCE            2/1990 
MALAYSIA            3/1990 
BELGIUM           3/1990 
SOUTH AFRICA         6/1990 
INDIA           8/1990 
PAKISTAN           3/1991 
SAUDI ARABIA       12/1991 
SINGAPORE                       7/1993 
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Table A2: Variable Definitions 
 
 
Short process patent 
  (< 15 years) 
Dummy = 1 if country protection only on pharmaceutical processes.  When the 
statutory term is defined to end “X years after grant,” the granting process is 
assumed to take 2 years.  As is appropriate for some countries, we take the min or 
max of “years from grant” and “years from filing” to estimate the statutory term. 
Short product   
     patents (< N years) 
 
Dummy = 1 if product patents are offered. 
Long process  
     (only)  patents  
Dummy = 1 if country offers only process patents with a statutory term ￿ 15 
years. 
Long process & 
product patents  
Dummy = 1 if both product and process innovations covered and term is at least 
15 years. 
Long process and/or 
product patents  
Dummy = 1 if either process or both process and product protection is offered and 
the term is at least 20 years. 
 
Strong 
“Strong” is a variable that takes on values between 0 and 1, with a higher value 
indicating that a country has more limits on how patent rights can be curtailed.   
 
Drug Patent Extension 
Dummy = 1 if firms may apply for an extension of the statutory term of patent 
protection to compensate for time taken in the marketing approvals process. 
 
Some Price Control 
Dummy  =  1  if  country  has  a  formal  price  control  mechanism  but  it  is  not 
extensive. 
 
Extensive Price Control 
Dummy  =  1  if  price  control  covers  most  of  the  market  and/or  is  viewed  as 
particularly restrictive. 
Tariff   




Dummy = 1 for national adoption of standard treatment guidelines 
National Formulary  Dummy = 1 for having a national formulary 
 
EMEA 
Dummy = 1 for years when a country is a member of the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency 
Health Expenditure 
Share of GDP 1995/97 
 
Mean annual total health expenditure during the years 1995-97 in 1995 U.S. $ 
Private Share of  All 
Health Expenditure 
Mean  private  health  expenditure  for  1995-97  as  a  share  of  mean  total  health 
expenditure 1995-97 
R&D share  Country R&D expenditure in all fields as share of GDP 
LnPopulation  Log of population  
LnGDPcapita  Log of GDP per capita in 1995 U.S. $ 
 
Gini Coefficient 
Estimated Gini coefficient of inequality (of household per-capita income in most 
cases) taken as close as possible to early 1990 but ranging from years 1987-99.   
Pct 65 yrs +   Percentage of total population aged 65 and older 
Pct 15-64 yrs  Percentage of total population aged 15 through 64 
Population Growth  Pct. Growth in total population over previous year 
GDP Growth  Pct. Growth in GDP over previous year 
Radios per capita 1990  Average radios per person in 1990 
Growth Radio 90-95  Percent increase in radios per 100 between 1990 and 1995 
Doctors/1000 in 1990  Doctors per thousand people as of 1990/2 (1990 if available) 
 
Growth Doctors 90-95 
Percent increase in doctors per thousand between 1990/2 and 1995/7 (1990 and 




Table A3: Variable Distributions  
   
All Data 
 
Early Period (1982-93) 








Policy Variables  Mean  S.D.   Mean   S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Process patent   0.853  0.345      0.752  0.422     
Short product   
     patents (< N years) 
0.536  0.492  0.880  0.326  0.334  0.463  0.837  0.370 
Long process  
     (only)  patents  
0.614 
 
0.487      0.407  0.492     
Long process & product 
patents 
0.473  0.499      0.263  0.441     
Long process and/or 
product patents 
    0.779  0.415      0.693  0.461 
Drug patent extension  0.614  0.487  0.856  0.352  0.407  0.492  0.819  0.386 
Some price control  0.833  0.372  0.784  0.412  0.319  0.466  0.347  0.476 
Extensive price control  0.397  0.489  0.349  0.477  0.462  0.499  0.379  0.485 
Tariff  9.657  8.114      7.94  5.38     
Essential Drug List  0.415  0.490  0.921  0.270  0.131  0.335  0.884  0.321 
Standard Treatment 
Guidelines 
0.178  0.373  0.972  0.164  0.082  0.272  0.957  0.204 
National Formulary  0.173  0.371  0.755  0.430  0.070  0.252  0.623  0.485 
EMEA Member      0.177  0.382         
                 
Control Variables                 
R&D share  0.487  0.449      0.382  0.342     
LnPopulation  17.205  1.255  16.398  1.317  17.384  1.158  16.518  1.241 
LnGDPcapita  7.661  0.840  9.950  0.407  7.570  0.840  9.875  0.394 
LnPop*LnGDPcapita  131.49  13.74  163.31  15.74  131.20  13.22  163.23  15.23 
Gini Coefficient  43.677  10.235  32.453  6.188  45.530  9.402  32.710  6.217 
Gini*LnGDPcapita  334.43  95.99  322.84  58.41  345.98  95.07  322.79  57.66 
Pct 65 yrs +   0.053  0.031  0.128  0.033  0.043  0.017  0.125  0.027 
Pct 15-64 yrs  0.600  0.005  0.666  0.027  0.582  0.035  0.665  0.028 
Population Growth  0.018  0.010  0.008  0.012  0.021  0.009  0.007  0.010 
GDP Growth  0.015  0.053  0.022  0.026  0.0109  0.0648  0.020  0.025 
Radios per capita 1990  0.331  0.203  0.824  0.385  0.301  0.180  0.848  0.386 
Growth Radios 90-95  0.136  0.425  0.139  0.934  0.157  0.474  0.039  0.067 
Doctors/1000 in 1990  1.343  1.037  2.432  1.063  1.345  1.018  2.474  1.077 
Growth Doctors 90-95  0.601  1.842  0.158  0.273  0.469  1.448  0.154  0.279 
Health Expenditure 
Share of GDP 1995/97 
0.054  0.019  0.080  0.019  0.053  0.019  0.081  0.018 
Private Share of  All 
Health Expenditure 
0.531  0.170  0.309  0.146  0.551  0.152  0.311  0.127 
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Table A4: Changes in Price Control and Patent Protection 
Early Period (1982-92) and Late Period (1993-2000) 
 










  Early   Late  Early  Late  Early  Late  Early  Late  Early  Late 
ARGENTINA      0            +  + 
BANGLADESH  +    +  0             
BOLIVIA                    + 
BRAZIL        0    +    +     
BULGARIA        0             
CENTRAL 
AMERICA  +  0  +  0  +    +  +     
CHILE          +    +       
COLOMBIA      0        +    +  + 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC      0               
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC      0               
ECUADOR                  +  + 
EGYPT                     
FRENCH WEST 
AFRICA      0               
HUNGARY      0          +    + 
INDIA        0             
INDONESIA  +        +    +       
JORDAN                +    + 
LATVIA  0  +  0               
LEBANON                +    + 
MALAYSIA                  0   
MEXICO  +    +  0  +    +       
MOROCCO                +     
PAKISTAN                +    + 
PARAGUAY                     
PERU      0        +    +  + 
PHILIPPINES  +                  + 
POLAND      0          +    + 
PUERTO RICO                    + 
RUSSIA  0  +  0               
SAUDI ARABIA          +    +       
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC  0  +  0               
SOUTH AFRICA    +    +             
SOUTH KOREA        0             
TAIWAN  +                  + 
THAILAND              +    +   
TUNISIA                     
TURKEY            +         
URUGUAY                +    + 




















  Early   Late  Early  Late  Early  Late  Early  Late  Early  Late 
AUSTRALIA                    + 
AUSTRIA              +       
BELGIUM                     
CANADA  +                +   
DENMARK  +    +, 0        +       
FINLAND        +        +     
FRANCE                     
GERMANY  +  0                 
GREECE                     
HONG KONG                     
IRELAND                  +   
ISRAEL                     
ITALY        0             
JAPAN                    + 
KUWAIT  +    +               
LUXEMBOURG                     
NETHERLANDS    +                 
NEW ZEALAND  +                  + 
NORWAY        +      +       
PORTUGAL  +              +    + 
SINGAPORE                     
SLOVENIA  0  +  0  +             
SPAIN              +       
SWEDEN        0             
SWITZERLAND                     
UK                     
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES                     
USA                    + 
 
Note: Changes are only indicated for a country during periods for which launch information is also 
available. + indicates and increase and 0 a decrease in the variable. 
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Table A5:  First-stage Regression Estimations 
The Probability of Extensive Price Control 
 
  Low- and Middle-income Countries  High-income Countries 
Variables  Coefficient  Estimated S.E.  Coefficient  Estimated S.E. 
LnPopulation  -0.008  0.023  -0.059  0.021 
LnGDPcapita   0.024  0.158  -3.908  0.563 
Gini Coefficient  -0.051*  0.031*  -1.178  0.177 
Gini*LnGDPcapita   0.004  0.004   0.115  0.017 
Pct 65 yrs +   -4.789  1.124   1.805  1.160 
Pct 15-64 yrs  -3.549  0.888  -5.574  1.291 
Instruments         
Executive_right   0.447  0.063   0.181*  0.105* 
Executive_left   0.376  0.064   0.369  0.105 
Executive_center   0.391  0.086   0.359  0.135 
Executive_natl  -0.412  0.071     
Tenure   0.007  0.003   0.008  0.007 
Military   0.201  0.050     
Budget Balance  -0.033  0.006   0.009  0.006 
Adjusted R
2  0.324  0.292 
No. Obs.  435  385 
 
Notes: The first three instruments are dummies for the economic orientation of the party of the chief 
executive. The fourth indicates if it is a nationalist party.   Tenure is the number of years that the chief 
executive has been in office.  Military indicates if he is a military officer.  Budget balance is overall, 
including grants, as a percent of GDP.  All instruments save tenure are lagged two years (as preferred 
by data).  Bold typeface and * indicate coefficients significant at a = 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. 
Sources: Political variables, the World Bank Database of Political Institutions, downloaded from 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/pkeefer.htm; Budget, World Development Indicators Online, 
2004 (both accessed April 5, 2004). 
 
 
   68 
General References 
 
Bloom, Nicholas and John van Reenen (1998) “Regulating Drug Prices: Where Do We Go from 
Here?” Fiscal Studies, Vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 321-42. 
 
Carpenter, Daniel, Brian Feinstein, Colin Moore, Marc Turenne,  Ian Yohai and Evan James 
Zucker (2004) “Why do Bigger Firms Receive Faster Drug Approvals?” Mimeo. Department of 
Government, Havard University. 
 
CDRI (1996). “Patents: Indian,” Drugs and Pharmaceuticals: Industry Highlights. NISSAT. 19 (3 
and 6), 35-39 and 43-48. 
 
Chaudhuri, Shubham, Penelopi Goldberg and Panle Jai (2004) “Estimating the Effects of Global 
Patent  Protection  in  Pharmaceuticals:  A  Case  Study  of  Quinolones  in  India.”  Mimeo.  Yale 
University. 
 
Danzon, Patricia, Wang, Y. Richard and Liang Wang (2005) “The Impact of Price Regulation on 
the Launch Delay of New Drugs,” Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 269-92. 
  
Dranove, David and David Meltzer (1994) “Do important drugs reach the market sooner,” RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 402-23. 
 
Ellison,  Sara  Fisher  and  Catherine  Wolfram  (2004)  “Coordinating  on  Lower  Prices: 
Pharmaceutical  Pricing  under  Political  Pressure.”  Mimeo.    Haas  School  of  Business,  U.C. 
Berkeley. 
 
Erfle, Stephen and Henry McMillan (1990) “Media, Political Pressure, and the Firm: The Case 
of Petroleum Pricing in the Late 1970s,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 115-34. 
 
Gabrowski,  Henry  G.  and  John  Vernon  (2000)  “Effective  Patent  Life  in  Pharmaceuticals,” 
International Journal of Technology Management. Vol. 19, nos. ½,  pp. 98-120. 
 
Ganslandt,  Matthias  and  Keith  E.  Maskus  (2004)  “The  Price  Impact  of  Parallel  Imports  in 
Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from the European Union,” Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 23, 
no. 5, pp. 1035-57. 
 
Glazer, Amihai and Henry McMillan (1992) “Pricing by the Firm Under Regulatory Threat,” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, no. 3, pp. 1089-99. 
 
Jack, William and Jean O. Lanjouw (2005) “Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much 
Should Poor Countries Contribute?” World Bank Economic Review, forthcoming. 
 
Kanavos,  Panos,  Joan  Costa-i-Font,  Sherry  Merkur,  Marin  Gemmill  (2004)  “The  Economic 
Impact of Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade in European Member States: A Stakeholder Analysis,” 
Special Research Paper, LSE Health and Social Care, the London School of Economics and 
Political Science.   69 
  
King, John L. (2003) “Patent Examination Procedures and Patent Quality,” in Wesley M. Cohen 
and Steven A. Merrill (eds.) Patents in the Knowledge-based Economy.  (Washington D.C.: The 
National Academies Press). 
 
Kyle, Margaret (2004a) “Pharmaceutical Price Controls and Entry Strategies,” Mimeo. Fuqua 
School of Business, Duke University. 
 
Kyle, Margaret (2004b) “The Role of Firm Characteristics in Pharmaceutical Product Launches,” 
Mimeo. Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. 
 
Lanjouw, J. O. (1998) “The Introduction of Product Patents in India: “‘Heartless Exploitation of 
the Poor and Suffering’?” NBER Working Paper no. 6366. 
 
Malueg,  David  and  Marius  Schwartz  (1994)  “Parallel  imports,  demand  dispersion,  and 
international price discrimination,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 167-95. 
 
McCalman,  Philip  (2004)  “International  Diffusion  and  Intellectual  Property  Rights:  An 
Empirical  Analysis,”  Journal  of  International  Economics.  (forthcoming).    Department  of 
Economics, U.C. Santa Cruz. 
 
Rivers, Douglas and Quang H. Vuong (1988) “Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity 
Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models,” Journal of Econometrics. Vol. 39, pp. 347-66. 
 
Sell,  Susan  (2003)  Private  Power,  Public  Law:  the  Globalization  of  Intellectual  Property.  
Cambridge Studies in International Relations. 
 
Scherer, F.M. and Jayashree Watal (2002) Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines 






Patents Throughout the  World. Subscription updated looseleaf publication (New York: West 
Group).  
 
World Patent Law and Practice: Patent Statutes, Regulations, and Treaties. John P. Sinnott and 
William Joseph Cotreau, eds. (New York: Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 1-800-833-9844.)  
Tariffs 
European Union (2003) “Working Document on Developing Countries’ Duties and Taxes on 
Essential Medicines used in the Treatment of Infectious Diseases,”  DG Trade, EU.  Ref. 135/03. 
Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/medicine/docs/wtosub_100303.pdf. 
   70 
Pharmaceutical Regulation 
Ballance,  R.,  J.  Pogany,  and  H.  Forstner.  1992.  The  World' s  Pharmaceutical  Industries.  An 
International  Perspective  on  Innovation,  Competition  and  Policy.  United  Kingdom:  Edward 
Elgar Jacobzone. 
 
Brudon, P. and C. Pénicaud. 1996. Le secteur pharmaceutique dans les pays de la zone CFA. 
WHO/DAP/95.8. Genèvre: Organisation mondiale de la Santé. 
 
Chalmers,  A.,  ed.  2002.  International  pharmaceutical  registration.  Denver,  Colo.:  Interpharm 
Press. 
 
Cohen, J. C. 2000. Public Policies in the Pharmaceutical Sector: A Case Study of Brazil. World 
Bank LCSHD Paper Series No. 54. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
 
Dag Hammarskjold Foundation. 1995. Making National Drug Policies a Development Priority: 
A Strategy Paper and Six Country Studies (Norway, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Australia, India, 
Mexico). Development Dialogue 1: 1-240. 
 
Govindaraj, R. and G. Chellaraj. 2002. The Indian Pharmaceutical Sector: Issues and Options for 
Health Sector Reform. World Bank Discussion Paper no. 437. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
 
Hill,  Suzanne  and  Kent  Johnson  (2004)  “Emerging  Challenges  and  Opportunities  in  Drug 
Registration and Regulation in Developing Countries,”  Issues Paper – Access to Medicines.   
DIFD Health Systems Resource Centre. 
 
Hogerzeil, H., et al. 1993. Field Tests for Rational Drug Use in Twelve Developing Countries. 
The Lancet 4 (December 1993): 1408-1410. 
 
Huttin,  C.  1999.  Drug  Price  Divergence  in  Europe:  Regulatory  Aspects.  Health  Affairs  18 
(May/June 1999): 245-9.  
 
Jacobzone,  S.  2000.    Pharmaceutical  Policies  in  OECD  Countries:  Reconciling  Social  and 
Industrial  Goals.  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD)  Labor 
market and Social Policy, Occasional Papers No. 40.  
 
Maksimova, L. 2001. Pharmaceutical Market in Russia. Industry Sector Analysis Series, U.S. 
Department of State.  
 
Nambu, T., R. Rapp and R. Rozek. 1998. Regulatory Influences on the Decision to Introduce 
Pharmaceutical Products in Japan. The Journal of World Intellectual Property 1 September 1998. 
 
Spivey, R., A. I. Wertheimer and T. D. Rucker, eds. 1992. International pharmaceutical services: 
the drug industry  and pharmacy  practice in twenty-three major countries of the  world. New 
York: Pharmaceutical Products Press. 
   71 
World Health Organization (WHO). 2000. Policies on Pricing and Reimbursement of Medicines 
in Europe. Networking for Information Exchange among Policy-makers, WHO Regional Office 
for Europe.  
 
________. 1999. Troisième Rencontre des Ministres de la Santé des Pays africains de la zone 
franc  et  des  pays  associés  sur  la  politique  du  medicament.  WHO/EDM/DAP/99.  Genèvre: 
Organisation mondiale de la Santé.  
 
________.  1997.  Comparative  analysis  of  national  drug  policies  in  12  countries. 
WHO/DAP/97.6. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
 
________.  1998.  Financing  Drugs  in  South-East  Asia.  .  Health  Economics  and  Drugs  DAP 
Series  No.  8.  Report  of  the  second  meeting  of  the  WHO/SEARO  Working  Group  on  Drug 
Financing. Geneva: World Health Organization.  
 
________. 1994. Drug Pricing Systems in Europe, An Overview. WHO/EURO. Geneva: World 
Health Organization.  
 
________. 1992. Latin American Conference on Economic and Financial Aspects of Essential 
Drugs. Caracas, March 1992. WHO/DAP/92.8. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
 
________.  1990.  Guiding  Principles  for  Small  National  Drug  Regulatory  Authorities.  WHO 
Expert Committee on Specifications for Pharmaceutical Products, Technical Report Series, no. 
790. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
 
World Bank. 2003. Turkey: Reforming the Health Sector for Improved Access and Efficiency. 
Sector Report, vol. 1 & 2. 
 
_________. 1997. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Health Sector Study. World Bank Country 
Study. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
 
Sarmiento,  A.  Z.  1995.  Alternative  Drug  Pricing  Policies  in  the  Americas.  WHO/DAP/95.6. 
Geneva: World Health Organization.  
 
Madrid,  I.  1998.  Pharmaceuticals  and  health  sector  reform  in  the  Americas:  an  economic 
perspective.  Washington,  D.C.  :  Action  Programme  on  Essential  Drugs,  World  Health 
Organization. 
 
Fefer, E. 1996. Drug regulation in Latin America. Drug Policy Issues 20 March 1996. Boston, 
MA: Boston University. 
 
_______, I. Madrid, and G. Velázquez. 1998. Pharmaceuticals and Health Sector Reform in the 
Americas: An Economic Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Health Organization and 
World Health Organization. 
   72 
_______ and G. Velasquez, eds. 1991. Pharmaceutical in the Americas. WHO/HTP/EDM 99.1. 
Geneva: World Health Organization. 
 
Whitaker, D. et al. 2002. Taiwan Pharmaceutical Price Gap: A Report for the PhRMA. National 
Economic Research Associates. London.  
 
Petrova, G. 2002. Reform in the pharmaceutical sector in Balkan countries: critical moments. 
Faculty of Pharmacy, MU-Sofia.  
 
Felker,  G.,  et  al.  1997.  The  Pharmaceutical  Industry  in  India  and  Hungary.  World  Bank 
Technical Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
 
Kanji, N., et al. 1992. Drugs Policy in Developing Countries. London: Zed Books. 
 
Lu,  Z. J., et al. 1998.  Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals. Review of Economics and 
Statistics n1 (February 1998): 108-18. 
 
Frank, R. G., et al. 1995. Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper: 5306.  
 
Litvack,  J.  I.,  D.  S.  Shepard,  and  J.  D.  Quick.  1989.  Setting  the  Price  of  Essential  Drugs: 
Necessity and Affordability. The Lancet 8659: 376-79 
 
Redwood, H. 1993. Price Regulation and Pharmaceutical Research: The Limits of Co-Existence. 
Felixstow, Suffolk, UK: Oldwicks Press Limited.  
 
Mossialos,  E.,  C.  Ranos,  and  B.  Abel-Smith,  eds.  1994.  Cost  Containment,  Pricing  and 
Pharmaceuticals in the European Community: The Policy-Makers'  View. Athens: LSE Health 
and Pharmetrica SA. 
 
Jommi, C. 2001. Pharmaceutical policy and organisation of the regulatory authorities in the main 
EU countries. Milano, EGEA. 
 
Raymond, M. and S. Ueber. 1978.  Health and policymaking in the Arab Middle East. Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies. Washington, DC: Georgetown University. 
 
United Nations (UN). 1976. Pharmaceuticals in Africa. United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Economic Commission for Africa. 
 
Gray, A., et al. 2002. Policy Change in a Context of Transition: Drug Policy in South Africa 
1989-1999. Center for Health Policy, School of Public Health, University of Witwatersrand.  
 
Department of Health. 1996. National Drug Policy for South Africa. Pretoria, South Africa. 
 
Islam, N. 1989. Bangladesh National Drug Policy: An Assessment. Trop Doctor 19:18-20. 
   73 
Gallagher, E. N. 1990. Egypt' s other wars: epidemics and the politics of public health. Syracuse, 
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 
 
Chowdhury, Z. 1995. The politics of essential drugs: the makings of a successful health strategy: 
lessons from Bangladesh. N.J.: Zed Books. 
 
Basant,  R.  2001.  Pharmaceutical  Industry  in  Pakistan.  Indian  Institute  of  Management, 
Ahmedabad and the World Bank, Washington, DC. 
 
Lee, M.B. 1994. The politics of pharmaceutical reform: the case of the Philippine National Drug 
Policy. International Journal of Health Services 1994; 24(3): 477-494. 
 
Bulgakov, D. 2000. Pharmaceutical price limits set. The Russia Business Journal, 2 Sept 2000. 
 
Schoonveld,  E.  2002.  Market  Segmentation  and  International  Price  Referencing.  Cambridge 
Pharma Consulting. 
 
Dukes,  G.  and  D.  Broun.  1994.  Pharmaceutical  Policies:  Rationale  and  Design.  Human 
Resources Development and Operations Policy. HRO Working Papers No. 35. World Bank. 
 
Danzon, P. M. 1997. Pharmaceutical price regulation: national policies versus global interests. 
Washington, D.C.: AEI Press. 
 
_________ and A. Towse. 2003. Differential pricing for pharmaceuticals: reconciling access, R 
& D and patents. Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. 
 
_________ and L. W. Chao. 2000. Cross-national price differences for pharmaceuticals: how 
large, and why? Journal of Health Economics 19 2000 159–195. 
 
Jayasuriya, D.C. 1985. Regulation of pharmaceuticals in developing countries: legal issues and 
approaches. Geneva: Albany, NY : World Health Organization. 
 
Wertheimer,  A.I.,  and  S.  K.  Grumer.  1992.  Overview  of  International  Pharmacy  Pricing. 
PharmacoEconomics December 2(6): 449-55.  
 
Burstall , M L. 1998. Pricing and Reimbursement in Western Europe 1998; A Concise Guide. A 
Pharma Pricing Review Report. 
 
Rosian  I.,  C.Habl  and  S.  Vogler.  1998.  Pharmaceuticals:  Market  control  in  nine  European 
countries. Austrian Health Institute, Vienna. 
 
Bala, K. and K. Sagoo. 2000. Patents and Prices. Health Action International. HAInews No 112 
April/May 2000.  
 
Gross, A. 1999. New Regulatory Trends in Thailand’s Pharmaceutical  Market. Report Date: 
March 1999. Pacific Bridge, Inc.   74 
 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 2002. Moscow Government Introduces New Pricing Regulations On 
Medicines.  Tax  Flash  Report.  Special  Pharmaceuticals  Issue  No.  5,  4  June  2002 
 
Ratanawijitrasin, S. and E. Wondemagegnehu. 2002. “Effective drug regulation: A multi-country 
study.” Geneva: World Health Organization.  
 
Health  Care  Systems  in  Transition:  (various  countries  and  years).  European  Observatory  on 
Health Care Systems. 
 
Kanavos, P. 2002. Financing Pharmaceuticals in Transition Economies. Department of Social 
Policy and LSE Health, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
 
________.  2002.  Pharmaceutical  Pricing  and  Reimbursement  in  Europe.  London,  UK:  PJB 
Publications. 
 
_________. 2000. The Single Market for Pharmaceuticals in the European Union in Light of 
European Court of Justice Rulings. PharmacoEconomics, Vol. 18, No. 6, pp. 523-532, December 
2000. 
 
________, E. Mossialos, and M. Mrazek. 2000. Pharmaceuticals: A Global Industry with Local 
Interests. In Parsons, L. and G. Lister (eds.) Global Health: A local issue. The Nuffield Trust. 
 
London School of Economic Study on Healthcare in Individual Countries: Worldwide Survey on 
Pharmaceutical  Pricing  and  Reimbursement  Structures.  Commissioned  by  Enterprise 
Directorate-General of the European Commission. 
 
Additional information was obtained from the health ministry websites of individual countries. 
 
 